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The Fifth National Government introduced the Housing Accord and Special Housing Areas 
Act 2013(HASHA) as a policy to increase housing affordability within certain region or 
districts identified as having housing supply and affordability issues. Now mostly repealed, 
HASHA aimed to achieve a short-term increase in land and housing supply through a market-
led process through a more enabling regulatory environment to ease house price pressures. In 
2015 the Nelson City Council and Tasman District Council entered into housing accords with 
central government which enabled SHA to be declared within their districts. This study aimed 
to evaluate what urban development for housing typologies have been incentivised through the 
implementation of HASHA at local government level in the Nelson Urban Area.  
This study applied a mixed-methods approach allowing convergent validation to address the 
research aim. This study established a comparative baseline for occupancy, demand, and 
housing supply under the normal regulatory regime of the Resource Management Act 1991 to 
assess how incentivisation of housing development outcomes has occurred. This was 
established by completing a document analysis of policies and resource consents in conjunction 
with geographic systems (GIS) analysis of property titles and building coverages which 
established a typological baseline. Interviews with key informants in the NUA provided 
insights into the implementation of HASHA and perspectives on what urban development for 
housing outcomes had resulted from it.  
The results of this study showed primarily a continuation of the status quo of low-density low-
rise residential housing development. However, the NUA also experienced an increase in the 
proportion of attached, higher density dwelling typologies relative to detached, lower density 
typologies. The implementation of HASHA was highly political. Policy goals of the 
government were imposed on the NCC and TDC through the decision-making hierarchy and 
alternative consenting path. Through this path, HASHA enabled a renegotiation of the user 
rights regime for land. This offered incentives in cost and risk reductions to developers which 
ultimately effected the feasibility of development. It was found that while this affected all 
development styles, the feasibility of higher density development typologies was most 
improved. A connection was established between the higher density developments and the 
future demand for these development typologies as residents desired utility value from homes 
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1 Introduction  
The ability of local authorities to ensure sufficient development capacity in high growth urban 
areas has been questioned in the face of rising housing unaffordability. Particular attention has 
been given to how the current planning and government structure enables or inhibits urban 
development for housing (e.g., Ministry for the Environment, 2010). Central government, 
under the National Party, introduced the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act 2013 
(HASHA) to address the growing housing affordability crisis. Through creating a more 
enabling environment for private housing development, this was intended to be a short-term 
fix for the issue. This intervention sought to improve the elasticity of housing supply through 
increasing the availability of land for private housing development through a fast-tracked, 
alternative consenting process. As the delivery of housing in New Zealand is a market-led 
activity, the implementation of HASHA has not been evaluated in terms of the market 
incentives which it offered for specific urban development typologies. Addressing housing 
affordability is a short-term goal with long-term implications through the impacts upon urban 
form and density (Preval et al., 2016). This research will seek to evaluate the urban 
development for housing outcomes from the implementation of HASHA at local government 
level in New Zealand using the Nelson Urban Area (NUA) as a case study.   
1.2 Policy and Political Context 
HASHA was introduced within the context of important questions surrounding the 
performance of the current resource management system for urban areas in New Zealand in the 
face of rising housing unaffordability nationwide. Two key issues were used to frame the 
problem and were prominent in the formulation of HASHA within a Ministry for the 
Environment report in 2010. The first was the poor recognition of the positive effects of 
development in the built environment within the resource consenting process. The second was 
the lack of responsiveness within land-use regulation to respond to changes in market structure 
and demand (Ministry for the Environment, 2010). 
Upon their election, the fifth National Government of New Zealand sought to address the issue 
of urban development for housing by creating a more permissive regulatory environment. 
HASHA was introduced as the first stage of significant changes to the resource management 
system. These included the introduction of the National Policy Statement on Urban 
Development Capacity and the Resource Legislation Amendment Act 2017. All three of which 




sought to enhance housing affordability by facilitating an increase in land and housing supply. 
The primary purpose of HASHA was to increase land and housing supply in specific regions 
or districts of New Zealand, where housing affordability issues were identified (section 4, 
HASHA 2013). The Act allowed territorial authorities to enter into an accord with the 
government to work together to address housing supply and affordability issues in the district 
of the territorial authority. The signing of a housing accord allows for two key processes to be 
applied: the declaration of Special Housing Areas (SHA), and the application of alternative 
resource consenting processes. This alternative consenting pathway can only be employed 
within SHA to fast-track development. The alternative consenting process essentially allows 
for the effect of the delivery of housing to be the primary consideration under section 34. 
Through establishing the hierarchy of matters which are to be considered, the considerations 
within Part 2 of the RMA are subverted to secondary matters.  
HASHA was intended to reduce artificial supply-side constraints on land availability for 
housing development introduced through planning legislation. This would improve the 
affordability, productivity, and liveability of our urban areas (Ministry for Business, 
Innovation, and Employment, 2013). The introduction of HASHA was championed as an 
apolitical, evidence-based policy (Murphy, 2014). The supporting arguments for this policy 
approach are embedded within the broader neoliberal ideological discourse, which 
problematises the role of planning within the supply of housing (Beer et al., 2007). The focus 
of this discourse surrounds the impact that regulatory planning regimes have on housing market 
elasticities through increasing costs and timelines (Gurran et al., 2014).  
Much of the existing literature on this policy exists within the Auckland setting. Of this 
literature, HASHA has been criticised as a method of changing power relations between central 
and local government (Murphy, 2014).  Additionally, criticism has also been levelled at results 
that have not improved the sustainability of urban areas due to the reliance on greenfield 
development (Preval et al., 2016). However, HASHA has also been implemented widely across 
smaller regional cities. It is essential to understand the impacts of previous legislation on urban 
environments of multiple scales. Thus, attention must be paid to the impact of HASHA on 
regional cities such as the NUA.  
Furthermore, the ad hoc implementation of legislation and policy to address pressures on urban 
development for housing has been labelled problematic and has been an immediate focus of 
the sixth Labour Government. Announcing the attention to undertake a comprehensive review 




of the resource management system within the cabinet paper presented by the Hon. David 
Parker on the 27th of June 2019, the government indicated that the review would draw upon 
work previously completed by the Ministry for the Environment, the New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, and the Resource Management Law Reform Synthesis published by the 
Environmental Defence Society in 2018 (Ministry for the Environment, 2019 pg. 14). 
Independently completed, the report presented three models of reform to the current system. 
All three models include provision for high-level spatial planning to guide integrated decision-
making and allow central government to influence urban land use decision-making. This would 
be achieved by incorporating a hierarchy of documents at the different levels of government 
(Severinsen and Peart, 2018).  The Minister for the Environment has indicated his preference 
for this role of spatial planning as a method to 'coordinate decision-making between central 
and local government" (Ministry for the Environment, 2019 pg. 9). This indicates that central 
government involvement in urban planning unlikely to be reduced under future legislation. 
Within this context, it is crucial to contribute evidence to evaluate the implementation and the 
effect of HASHA on housing development outcomes. This would contribute to the formulation 
of policy responses to urban development in New Zealand.  
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to evaluate urban development for housing that has been incentivised 
by the implementation of HASHA at local government level in the Nelson Urban Area New 
Zealand.  
The implementation of these policies is left to local authorities under the current governance 
structure. It is beyond the scope of this research to consider all urban areas which have 
implemented this policy. As such, this aim and the following objectives will focus on 
evaluating the implementation within the NUA. The NUA has been selected as a case study as 
it is a regional city experiencing strong population growth. Additionally, two unitary 
authorities, the Nelson City Council (NCC) and Tasman District Council (TDC), administer 
the area, which allows for a comparison between the implementation of HASHA between the 
councils. This research seeks to evaluate the outcomes of policy through the implementation 
of HASHA. To support this aim three research objectives have been developed: 
Objective 1: To assess the implementation of the Housing Accords and Special 
Housing Areas Act 2013 in the Nelson Urban Area. 
 




This objective looks to examine how devolved decision-making has approached the 
implementation of the policy. This will involve a consideration of the methods by which local 
authorities have responded to HASHA, including changes to regulatory plans, exercising of 
consenting powers, and the development of any supporting non-statutory planning policy. 
 
Objective 2: To evaluate how the implementation of policy can provide incentives for 
particular urban development typologies in the Nelson Urban Area. 
This objective involves the consideration of the mechanisms through which methods of 
implementation by local authorities can or have influenced urban development. This will 
include the identification of different factors and variables which exert an influence on the 
process  
Objective 3: To assess what urban development typologies have resulted the incentives 
offered under the implementation of the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas 
Act 2013 in the Nelson Urban Area.  
This objective is the holistic interpretation of the previous two objectives and the result of 
policy intervention implementation. Focus will be given to the identification of factors that can 
be linked to specific urban development outcomes and typologies. This will form the basis for 
the evaluation of the research question. Figure 1 below displays how these objectives relate to 
the implementation of central government policy and the research question. 
This study's findings will contribute to the literature and the evidence base for how policy 
interventions are implemented. This includes the causal pathways through which they affect 
urban development outcomes in regional cities in New Zealand. The results of this study could 
be used to inform the district plan reviews which are occurring in Nelson and Tasman councils. 
This would support the broader goal of further intensification and increasing housing choices 
in the face of continued growth and an aging population.   





Figure 1: A schematic of how the research aim and objectives relate to the implementation of HASHA and what they seek to 
address. 
 
1.4 Research Strategy and Structure 
This chapter has outlined the background to this research and the objectives which define the 
scope of this study. The following chapter will provide further context for the study and 
introduce the case study research area. Chapter 3 will provide a literature review of policy 
interventions and the discourse around them. This chapter will provide the research framework 
by exploring the mechanisms of incentivisation and the urban development typologies which 
will be used in the evaluation. Chapter 4 will then provide a discussion on the methodological 
approach, which will be used to obtain the results of the research. The results will be split into 
three chapters. Chapter 5 will present the results of the qualitative analysis of the identified 




policy documents and the quantitative geographic information system analysis which 
establishes the baseline for housing development typologies between 2005-2014. Chapter 6 
will present the results from the interviews with participants which relate to the first research 
objective. Chapter 7 will present the results from the interviews with participants that relate to 
the second and third research objectives in conjunction with the analysis of resource consent 
applications and decisions. The discussion in Chapter 8 will synthesize these results with the 
conclusions of the literature to present in relation to addressing the research aim. Finally, 
Chapter 9 will present the concluding remarks of this research. 




2 Research Context  
At its core, HASHA is an alternative consenting process that exists outside of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA). Evaluating the impact of this process on urban development 
for housing requires an understanding of the regular legislative framework for resource 
management decision making in New Zealand. This chapter will establish this legislative 
context for the research through an exploration of the RMA and the Local Government Act 
2002 (LGA). While not directly related to decision-making, due to the infrastructure 
considerations of HASHA, it is essential also to introduce the LGA. 
This chapter will contribute to addressing the second and third research objectives by enabling 
an understanding of how the implementation of HASHA and the alternative consenting 
pathway can incentivise urban development outcomes. Additionally, the key findings of 
government reports on the adequacy of the current resource management system for urban 
development will be presented to provide context for problem definition within the introduction 
of HASA.  
2.1 National Legislation  
Resource management relating to urban development for housing is a complex field with two 
core pieces of legislation exerting influence over the process, including the RMA and the LGA. 
Due to the scope of the research, this discussion will be focussed only on the key aspects that 
directly relate to it.   
2.1.1 Resource Management Act 1991 
The RMA is the primary planning and environmental statute in New Zealand. This section will 
provide a brief overview of the RMA and the structures which exist for its administration and 
its application to decision making. The RMA is a framework statute that outlines the roles and 
responsibilities for the different hierarchies of government. Importantly, it establishes the 
legislative basis for decision-making concerning resource management, which is informed by 
the purposes and principles contained within Part 2 of the Act. The purpose of the RMA is to 
provide for the sustainable management of natural and physical resources. Sustainable 
management is defined within section 5(2) of the Act as: 
‘managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to 




provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being and for their 
health and safety while— 
a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources 
(excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of 
future generations; and 
b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities 
on the environment.’ 
This definition forms the basis and guiding philosophy on which all resource management 
decision making occurs. The following sections will explore how this is applied.  
2.1.1.1 Ideology  
The RMA adopts an effects-based approach to planning rather than explicitly controlling the 
activities, which was the norm under the preceding Town and Country Planning Act 1974. In 
adopting this approach, the rationale was that through establishing ‘environmental bottom 
lines’ through district plans, market forces would be left to create the most efficient use of 
resources in line with those standards (Perkins and Thorns, 2001). The implementation of this 
drew heavily from the ideology of the New Right with a strong emphasis on the allocation of 
private property rights to resources as a method of ‘internalising environmental externalities’ 
arising from development (Memon and Gleeson, 1995 pg. 119). Importantly for the context of 
this research, the RMA makes no differentiation between urban and non-urban environments; 
environmental bottom lines were employed to manage both. The use of environmental bottom 
lines has implications for how the positive effects of urban development are weighted within 
decision-making.  This focus on the environment and effects was labelled a direct attempt at 
excluding social and economic considerations from the process (Perkins and Thorns, 2001). 
This focus, in theory, limited the discretion of decision-makers only to consider whether 
activities breached established environmental bottom lines.   
2.1.1.2 Administration  
The statutory duties of the RMA vary between levels of government. Specific administrative, 
legislative, regulatory, enforcement, decision making, and judicial roles are assigned to central, 
regional, and local governments (Warnock and Baker-Galloway, 2014). There are two levels 
of government: Central Government, and Local Government. This structure of governance 
promotes devolved decision making, putting the burden of much of the implementation and 
decision making on Local Government. This model of administration stops well short of total 




devolution as significant powers remain for central government to establish policy and call in 
on matters of national significance. Additionally, plans made at the local government level 
cannot be inconsistent with plans or policies higher in the hierarchy.  The roles and 
responsibilities of the levels of government are shown in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2: The Resource Management Act 1991 Hierarchy 
In fulfilling their duties under the RMA, Regional Councils and Territorial Local Authorities 
must prepare and administer plans which give effect to the purposes and principles of Part 2. 
These plans enable councils to exercise control on activities based upon their environmental 
effects, determining what the appropriate use of that land will be. These controls constrain how 
the land can be used for housing. Under the RMA, the level of regulatory restrictiveness 
prescribed within plans is measured by the status of that particular development activity. 
Activity status is based upon the adverse effects which that activity produces and determines 
whether a resource consent is required (Table 1). The activity status determines the limit of the 
discretion, which the local authority can exercise on issues and environmental effects through 
the consent process. Plans can either be enabling (more permitted or controlled activities with 
looser performance standards/definitions for the environmental effects) or restrictive (more 
discretionary or non-complying activities and more stringent standards for the environmental 
effects of activities). A housing development that is inconsistent with the permitted standards 




within a plan can apply for resource consent; however, the granting of the consent is at the 
discretion of the council. Importantly, the council has the power to notify applications for 
resource consent that it considers will have a more than minor environmental effect. Council 
maintains considerable discretion on the level of notification through the determination of the 
significance of the effects or who the potential affected parties of an application are. 
Notification can either be full public or limited to those who are determined to be affected 
parties. Public notification can be a lengthy process involving a period of consultation and 
hearings which enable legal appeals to decisions. The impact of this being that there is no 
guarantee of consent ever being granted, creating a significant amount of uncertainty for larger 
developments. Thus, under the framework of the RMA, councils have significant control over 
the rate and style of urban development for housing that occurs. 
Table 1: Land use activity classifications under the RMA 
Activity Classifications under the RMA 
Permitted No resource consent is required. 
Controlled 
Resource consent required. Consent 
authority must grant consent if the 
application is complete and complies with 
all standards. 
Restricted Discretionary 
Resource consent is required. Consent 
authority’s power to decline consent is 
restricted to specified matters over which 
discretion can be exercised. 
Discretionary 
Resource consent is required. The consent 
authority has unlimited scope to grant or 
refuse giving consent. Must also comply 
with any requirements, conditions, and 
permissions specified in the Resource 
Management Act, regulations, or relevant 
plan. 
Non-complying 
Resource consent is required. The consent 
authority can only grant consent if it is 
satisfied that the adverse effects on the 
environment will be minor or the activity is 
not contrary to any policy and plans. 
Prohibited No resource consent may be issued. 
 




2.1.2 Local Government Act 2002 
While not directly relating to decision-making under the RMA, the LGA establishes the general 
framework, obligations, restrictions, and powers under which local authorities operate. Section 
10 outlines the purpose of local government, with reference made to: 
(a) to enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, 
communities; and 
(b) to meet the current and future needs of communities for good-quality local 
infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions in a way 
that is most cost-effective for households and businesses. 
Planning under the LGA embraces a more comprehensive public policy ambit than that of the 
RMA by taking into account the economic, social, and cultural interests of people and 
communities within a sustainable development approach.  
Local authorities are mandated to prepare Long-Term Plans (LTP), which set the priorities for 
ten years and have to be reviewed every three years. An LTP has to outline planned activities, 
community outcomes, capital expenditure on infrastructure and services such as three waters, 
flood protection, roads and footpaths, and forecast revenue. Included within the LTP is a 30-
year infrastructure strategy that should identify issues, plans for maintenance, and capital 
expenditure plans for improving assets. This strategy manages the timing of infrastructure 
investment for urban growth, which is essential for HASHA as availability of infrastructure is 
a significant consideration of supply-side constraints to housing development. While 
independent of the RMA, there is an expectation that because the LTP records identified 
preferable community outcomes and how local government will contribute to those goals that 
the LTP will help inform plans and strategies under the RMA. Figure 3 below demonstrates 
and clarifies the relationships between documents produced under the LGA and RMA  
 





Figure 3: Linkages between different statutes and the plans produced showing the relationships and inputs. Adapted from 
Productivity Commission, 2017).  
2.2 Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act 2013 
While the main features of HASHA, the SHA and alternative consenting process, have been 
briefly identified, this section will provide a broader overview of its content and how this relates 
or contrasts to the decision-making framework under the RMA. 
HASHA was introduced in 2013 as an independent piece of legislation with the primary 
purpose of enhancing housing supply and affordability. The Act sought to address two key 
planning related features of housing development: land supply restrictions, and costs and delays 
in the regulatory process (Ministry for Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2013). The 
regulatory impact statement for this legislation places emphasis on the impact of planning 
regulation on the elasticity of housing supply through constraints on land availability for 
housing development.  
To address these constraints, the Act established processes that enable an increase in both the 
supply of land and housing supply in specified areas that are identified as having housing 
affordability issues (Ministry for Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2013). This Act 




allows for councils within those areas to enter into a housing accord with central government, 
which sets collaborative actions and targets to increase the immediate and long-term supply of 
land for housing. This collaborative agreement provides an extension of the powers and 
abilities of central government to exert influence and control on planning under the devolved 
structure of the RMA and LGA. Importantly, through the enactment of this legislation outside 
of the RMA framework, it negated the need to undertake the required long process of amending 
plans and policies to ensure consistency with higher-level policy. The sections of the Act 
allowing SHA's to be declared expired on the 16 September 2019; subsequently all SHA's will 
be disestablished. However, the effects of HASHA remain as resource consents lodged under 
HASHA must still be processed under it. There are three critical features of the SHA process 
that are relevant for this research, which will be explored below.  
The power to declare a SHA lies with the central government. Local government can 
recommend a SHA within their boundaries to the responsible Minister, who may then approve 
the SHA; however, they are under no obligation to approve it. The Minister can also impose a 
SHA despite no recommendation from local government being received or a housing accord 
signed. The following criteria must be considered when recommending or approving a SHA 
(Section 16(3)): 
a) Adequate infrastructure to service qualifying developments exists or is likely to exist, 
and 
b) There is evidence of demand to create qualifying developments in the area, and 
c) There will be demand for residential housing in the area. 
The primary function of SHA is to fast track housing development by providing an alternative 
consenting pathway for qualifying developments. A qualifying development must be 
predominately residential, and dwellings must not be higher than six storeys or 27 metres. 
Additionally, the development must contain at least the prescribed minimum number of 
dwellings and at least the prescribed percentage of affordable dwellings (Section 14(1)). 
The alternative consenting process implements an enabling approach to housing development 
that significantly alters the matters to which decision-makers must have regard to when 
considering resource consent applications. In addition to this, Section 25 of HASHA allows for 
persons to apply for resource consent for an activity where it would otherwise be prohibited 
under the relevant plan, effectively overriding considerations within the relevant district plan. 
The matters in Part 2 of the RMA, which under the standard consent process inform all 




decisions, are subjugated below the primary purpose of HASHA. Section 34 outlines the 
following matters which must be considered and their position within the hierarchy: 
a. The purpose of this Act 
b. The matters in Part 2 of the RMA 
c. Any relevant proposed plan 
d. The other matters that would arise for consideration under  
i. section 104 to 104F of the RMA where the application is being processed 
under that Act 
e. the key urban design qualities expressed in the Ministry for the Environment’s New 
Zealand Urban Design Protocol (2005) and any subsequent editions of that 
document.  
This alternative consenting process represents a significant departure from the status quo under 
the RMA. The intended effect of this is that much more, if not all, urban and peri-urban land 
would be considered for housing development. The consequence of this is that the ‘capability 
and the practical abilities of private developers to take on developments’ becomes the primary 
determinant in urban development for housing occurring – not the environmental effects of that 
activity (Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2013). The scope given to 
developers effectively eliminates the uncertainty which is present when applying for resource 
consent for a restricted discretionary, discretionary, or non-complying activity under the RMA. 
To further support streamlining the process of applying for resource consent under the Act, 
public notification is precluded under s 29.  This preclusion eliminates rights of appeal to 
decisions to grant resource consent for housing developments, contributing to the increased 
certainty which this Act seeks to give developers. Ultimately, the combined effect of this and 
the approach of HASHA to improving housing supply is to allow all land to be considered for 
housing development and provide greater certainty to developers to encourage the use of that 
land.  
2.3 Framing the Problem: Reviews of Planning in New Zealand 
Through attempting to manage both urban and non-urban environments under environmental 
effects-based legislation, significant attention has been given to the performance of the RMA 
for the management of urban growth. This section will provide further context to the approach 
of HASHA to improving housing supply. From the early stages of implementation, 
shortcomings were apparent in the RMA. In privileging the environmental bottom line 




approach for decision making, the RMA has hamstrung the ability of local authorities to 
address socio-economic matters within decision making as it leaves this up to the market 
(Perkins and Thorn, 2001). It has been argued that this has led to the reliance on non-statutory 
plans under the LGA to outline the social and economic objectives of local government 
(Freeman, 2004). The suitability of the RMA for managing urban growth has also been 
questioned outside of academic literature. The most critical reviews are within the three reports 
on the planning system that have been completed in the last decade include: Building 
Competitive Cities (Ministry for the Environment, 2010); Using Land for Housing (New 
Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015); Better Urban Planning (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2017). While two of the three reports were published after the introduction of 
HASHA, the issues identified within them provide valuable context into the framing of the role 
of planning in housing affordability issues within New Zealand. The report content was 
examined in relation to the approach of central government and HASHA to improving housing 
supply.  
All three reports identify that the current resource management system, through its focus on 
environmental effects, limits the ability of decision-makers to consider the positive social and 
economic benefits of urban development for housing. Two main components are identified 
within this. The first relates to the current framework limiting the consideration of positive 
effects to amenity values (Ministry for the Environment, 2010) while the second relates to the 
weighting of and the perceived obligation to protect the natural environment from housing 
development within the decision-making of local authorities (New Zealand Productivity 
Commission, 2015; 2017). To address this, HASHA elevates the delivery of housing to the 
primary consideration under the alternative consenting process. This elevation directs decision-
makers to weigh the social and economic benefits of urban development appropriately. 
Similarly, all reports highlight the role of risk aversion of decision-makers in housing 
affordability issues. Through the direction to avoid, remedy, or mitigate environmental effects, 
it is argued that this rewards NIMBY behaviour through risk-averse decisions to publicly notify 
applications (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015). The effect of this is that it leads 
to the continuation of the status quo for urban development, as increasing the potential for 
delays and uncertainty disincentives alterative development typologies (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2010). A further consequence of this is identified as the multiple avenues it 
creates to relitigate issues (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2017). This has the effect 
of creating tax incentives for property speculators to withhold land until greater certainty over 




development is obtained (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015). The role of risk 
aversion in the responsiveness of housing supply is also emphasised within these reports. 
Through increasing delays, it was argued that this prevents the timely release of land for 
development (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015). When coupled with the lack of 
market monitoring and the high resource burden associated with preparing and changing RMA 
plans, this significantly increases the potential for the formation of market bubbles (Ministry 
for the Environment, 2010).  HASHA addresses these issues through the prevention of public 
notification and removing the rights of appeal to decisions made under the alternative 
consenting process.  
Interestingly, the criticism that is directed at the state of the RMA mirrors the views about the 
Town and Country Planning Act before it was repealed. Opponents of the system attributed a 
combination of a flawed ideology and regulatory inefficiencies with unnecessary 'delay, 
inflexibility, and costs… and alleged detrimental implications for economic growth and job 
creation' (Memon and Gleeson, 1995, pg. 114). While this has not been an exhaustive 
exploration of these documents, it does provide valuable context for the underlying 
assumptions of how the housing affordability is framed within HASHA.   
2.4 Summary  
This chapter contrasts the decision-making frameworks of the RMA and HASHA. Through the 
change in the hierarchy of matters in granting resource consent, the delivery of housing 
becomes the primary consideration. The effect of this being that the positive effects of housing 
development are weighted higher than other environmental effects. In conjunction with 
exclusions on public notification and rights of appeal, HASHA seeks to provide greater 
certainty to developers – freeing the delivery of housing from the normal environmental bottom 
line considerations of the RMA. This has been a deliberate response to issues raised within the 
reviews of the planning system in New Zealand. The implications of this for the NUA will be 
outlined in Chapters 6 and 7. 




3 Literature Review  
To inform the context and the theoretical background of this research, a critical analysis of the 
literature relating to policy interventions and urban development outcomes is critical. This 
review is to provide the grounding through which the process of implementing policy and 
incentivisation of outcomes occurs. A wide array of literature is used to inform this Chapter; 
sourced primarily from peer-reviewed journals. However, some articles used are working 
papers or government research reports. Approaching this review has required articles to be 
reviewed that have their origins in politics, land use planning policy and economics. A large 
body of literature has developed in the American, British, Australian and, to a lesser extent, 
New Zealand context; the similarity of planning regimes between the latter is valuable for this 
research. 
This chapter presents the literature which is relevant to the research aim of evaluating the urban 
development for housing that has been incentivised by the implementation of HASHA within 
the Nelson Urban Area. The literature review is structured around the process displayed in 
Figure 4, derived from preliminary research on housing supply. This process views urban 
development for housing as the result of a market process (represented by the red and black 
arrows) which passes through housing objectives, regulatory plans and policy, and incentives 
to deliver the observable outcomes. The housing objectives and regulatory plans and policy 
layers represent the broader regulatory system through which the market actors must navigate 
to deliver housing. The incentives layer represents an additional step which can affect the 
observable outcomes of the market process under the standard regulatory regime. The hole in 
this layer represents urban development for housing which have not been incentivised, thus 
what would be delivered solely under the RMA. HASHA is depicted as being informed by the 
housing objectives and influencing the regulatory plans and policies and the incentives layers. 
This review will examine the nature of these relationships. 
Following the structure presented in Figure 4, this Chapter provides an overview of how the 
literature addresses these areas. This chapter will begin with an exploration of the broader 
external influences on the regulatory system and housing objectives within New Zealand, 
including neoliberalism and the problematisation of planning within housing affordability 
debates. Following this is an exploration of the politics of power relations in devolved 
governance and how this affects the implementation of policy in New Zealand. Next, this 




chapter will provide an overview of the market processes which supply housing and how 
planning and regulation influence housing development. Then the economics of planning and 
the imposition of costs will be explored to develop the framework for evaluating incentivisation 
and how these produce a variation in the housing development under the normal regulatory 
system. Finally, urban form and metrics used to evaluate housing development will be explored 
to provide the basis of evaluating the urban development outcomes from the implementation 




Figure 4: The structure of this literature review follows the process outlined here derived through a preliminary review of 
literature relating to housing supply.  




3.1 Neoliberalism in Housing Objectives and Policy  
This section is not intended to devolve into a discussion on the impact of neoliberalism on 
planning. Instead, it is intended to describe the environment in which HASHA was designed. 
The current urban planning environment is a reflection of the policy formulation under the 
neoliberal ideology. The neoliberal approach to policy implies a ‘shift from government to 
(partly private strategies, or a conversion from publicly planned solutions to competitive and 
market-oriented ones’ (Sager, 2011 p. 2).  This spread of the neoliberalism into the political 
environment has informed much of the policy which has been implemented in New Zealand, 
including the RMA (Thorns and Perkins, 2001). However, the ideologies behind planning and 
neoliberalism are, at times, conflicting. It has been argued that this runs to contrary to what is 
planning is actually attempting to do, as ‘planning, at its essence, is an attempt to direct private-
sector behaviour affected the built form of our cities in pursuit of a conceptualisation of the 
public good, expressed in environmental, social, or economic goals’ (Buxton et al., 2012 p. 
104).  
This conflict translates into the policy which guides urban development and the spaces we 
occupy. Thus, the ideology of neoliberalism has had a profound influence on shaping our urban 
spaces. Peck and Tickell (2002) argue that neoliberalism is not just confined to institutions but 
also the space in between. They argue that this is possible because, despite the promotion of 
'deregulation' within the 'roll-back' phase of neoliberalism, a second 'roll-out' stage allowed 
new forms of institutional 'hardware' which imprints the ethos of neoliberalism within urban 
space (Peck and Tickell, 2002). This imprinting has occurred through two key avenues. Firstly, 
neoliberalism promotes competitive interlocal relations, which promotes an extrospective 
scanning of the horizon to monitor competitors and emulate 'best practice (Peck and Tickell, 
2002). Secondly, neoliberalism has also ‘constructed the rules of interlocal competition by 
shaping the very metrics by which regional competitiveness, public policy, corporate 
performance or social productivity are measured’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002 pg. 387). The effect 
of this is the creation of an environment where cities, as the nexus for economic productivity, 
are competing internationally to grow further and remain competitive. The evolution or spread 
of this ideology has led to a proliferation of growth first urban development policies, 
implementation of competitive markets within urban development, and the prioritisation of 
technocratic, depoliticised measures of urban performance (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Jessop 
(2002) describes this as the subordination of social policy in favour of a market-led economic 
policy to deliver socially beneficial development within urban areas. These characteristics of 




the implementation of neoliberal policy have enabled it to spread beyond institutions into the 
physical environment, shaping the urban development outcomes of government policy.  
3.1.1 Roll back and Roll Out: Neoliberalism in Housing Supply 
There is an established body of literature which addresses the role of neoliberal policy in 
housing supply. Peck and Tickell (2002) identify this within their ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out’ of 
neoliberal policy. Traditionally welfarist governments have been willing to intervene in the 
supply of housing to support the creation of a 'home-owning democracy' in New Zealand 
(Murphy, 2004). State lending schemes supported large scale state provision of housing for 
first-time owners while local government had very little involvement (Austin et al., 2014). 
Reform of the housing sector in the 1990s saw the New Zealand Government withdraw or ‘roll-
back’ from the provision of housing to the governance of activities, believing that market was 
the appropriate mechanism for the delivery of housing (Thorns, 2006; Murphy, 2004). This 
pattern of roll-back neoliberalism within the supply of housing has been repeated widely, with 
similar experiences in Australia and England (e.g. Beer et al., 2007; Austin et al., 2014).   
The rise of the ‘housing affordability crisis’ has seen a shift to ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism, as states 
push policy fixes to the issue. The focus has been on a shift from government to governance 
and allowing structures to develop that enable partnership-based forms of governance and 
supply (Jessop, 2002). This shift has seen the reallocation of power, responsibility, and 
resources downwards, and often outwards through privatisation, through which the state seeks 
to direct not implement policy (Beer et al., 2007). The rationale for this is based upon the 
underlying ideology of neoliberalism, one which views state failure as inevitable so promotes 
‘a juridicopolitical framework that offers passive support for market solutions’ (Jessop, 2002 
pg. 461). The policy implemented in response to the 'housing affordability crisis' reflects this. 
Within the New Zealand context, HASHA has been identified as a pragmatic and arguably 
successful form of local/central government and private cooperation (Murphy, 2015). Similar 
responses have been enacted in Australia and England. Australia has experienced significant 
planning reform at the state and territory level where policy was pushed which promoted the 
removal of ‘green’ and ‘red’ tape at lower levels to, in theory, enable a faster market response 
to housing affordability (Gurran and Ruming, 2016). Similarly, England has also relied on 
market supply, using a state introduced policy of Section 106 of the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990. This policy allows local government to enter into agreements with 
developers to provide a certain number of affordable dwellings as part of the development 




(Austin et al., 2007). The creation of these regulatory environments is a further intertwining of 
the neoliberal ideology within planning and society as the ‘roll-out’ continues.  
3.1.2 Roll Out and Policy Convergence  
‘Roll-out’ neoliberal policy has been identified as a cause of homogenisation and similarity of 
policy relating to the provision of land supply for housing through reforms of planning policy 
(Gurran et al., 2014). Murphy (2014) identified the role of policy convergence within the 
formulation of HASHA to address housing affordability in New Zealand. Policy convergence 
reflects how neoliberalism advocates ‘for supposedly universal cures and one best way policy 
strategies’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002 pg. 387). The similarity of housing policy acts as an 
example of the wider phenomena of policy convergence. Policy convergence is conceptually 
defined as the growing similarity of policies over time (Holzinger and Knill, 2005). Simmons 
and Elkins (2004) identify three casual pathways which contribute to the diffusion of policy: 
direct economic competition, informational networks, and social emulation. The first, direct 
economic competition, is a reflection of globalization as governments are all ‘competing for 
the same slice of global capital’ (Simmons and Elkins, 2004 pg. 187). The second, information 
networks, is also related to globalisation but is the availability of information. A core 
component of this is 'lesson drawing' in which policy is adopted based upon the observable 
outcomes from other countries (Holzinger and Knill, 2005). The final causal pathway is social 
emulation, which describes governments tendencies to adopt policies from other countries 
which share similar cultural values (Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Simmons and Elkins, 2004).   
Concerning housing supply, literature refers to the causal pathway of lesson drawing in the 
context of policy transfer to address housing affordability issues (Benson and Jordan, 2011). 
Planning reform presents significant opportunities for policy transfer to occur as governments 
actively pursue new ideas and models applied across multiple settings (Gurran et al., 2014). 
Neoliberalism enhances the opportunities for policy transfer as ‘governance processes that 
emphasise ‘best practice’ and global ‘benchmarking’’ foster an enabling environment 
(Murphy, 2014 pg. 894). The notion of international competitiveness also plays a significant 
part as coercive forces produce ‘a constantly shifting landscape of experimentation, 
restructuring, (anti)social learning, technocratic policy transfer and partial emulation’ (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002 pg. 396). Reviews of the role of planning within urban development across 
England, Australia, and New Zealand have all invariably painted planning as a constraint on 
development (e.g. Barker, 2006; New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2015). The policy 
instruments that have been deployed to address this follow similar but distinct paths as states 




draw lessons from the implantation of policies targeting planning as a supply-side constraint. 
Typical objectives of these policies include reducing delays, increasing certainty and 
predictability of decision making and increasing the supply of infrastructure (Gurran et al., 
2014). Heterogeneity in the implementation of these policies demonstrates the application of 
lesson drawing. Further evidence of policy convergence can be found in the evolution and 
implementation of inclusionary housing policies across all three jurisdictions (Austin et al., 
2014). Neoliberalism has, therefore, clearly influenced the formulation of policy to address 
housing affordability and thus urban development.   
3.2 Planning Regulation and Housing Supply  
In fulfilling a regulatory duty, planning is maligned as a hurdle or bureaucratic red tape through 
which developers must pass through in order to deliver housing. This attitude has pervaded 
across multiple jurisdictions (Gurran et al., 2014). Planning has been problematised as a 
significant constraint on the supply of housing situated within the broader context of policy 
convergence. Government inquiries across the UK, Australia, and New Zealand have placed 
significant emphasis on this as a critical contributor to housing affordability issues (e.g. Gurran 
et al., 2014; Beer et al., 2007; Murphy, 2014; Gurran and Phibbs, 2015). The focus on planning 
and interventions which address supply-side constraints is a demonstrable example of 
convergence within the neoliberal policy ‘roll-out’ (Gurran et al., 2014). The evidence 
presented within these reports has been used to support a quintessential neoliberal policy to 
housing affordability through fostering a competitive market and market-based solutions to 
public policy issues across multiple contexts jurisdictions (Nicholls, 2014). Gurran and Phibbs 
(2016) have argued that housing affordability issues have been used as an avenue for further 
neoliberal reform by governments seeking greater market growth and development. This 
section explores how the problematisation of planning has occurred. 
3.2.1 Evidenced-Based Policy and Housing 
A key facilitator of housing policy transfer to New Zealand has been the deployment of 
evidence-based policy (EBP) which has become the dominant discourse of urban planning 
reform (Murphy, 2015). Through the promotion of technical rationality, EBP is used as a shield 
behind which the underlying ideological and political construction of issues hides (Jacobs and 
Manzi, 2013). The promotion of EBP entrenches the role of lesson drawing and can illustrate 
the path dependencies that can pervade under the ‘roll-out’ of neoliberalism. This entrenchment 
arises through the endorsement of technical measures which limits the scope for genuinely 




novel ideas or policy solutions to be implemented due to a limited evidence base (Peck and 
Tickell, 2001). Policy transfer and EBP has become a tool for the wider ideological conflict 
between the social aspects of planning and the economically informed neoliberalism. A 
significant amount of literature which analyses the effects of planning from an economic 
position concludes that planning is a key cause of housing affordability issues through 
constraint and inelasticity of supply (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2005; Gykouro and Saks, 2008). This 
evidence has been selectively deployed to reinforce the rhetoric has been applied across all of 
England, Australia, and New Zealand, that ‘problematises’ planning and reform pushed 
through on the strength of these critiques (Gurran et al., 2014). However, Murphy (2014) 
argues that this evidence has been selectively employed to 'problematise' planning within 
broader debates around housing affordability.  This problematisation reflects the subordination 
of social policy for economic policy that pervades throughout the roll-out of neoliberalism 
(Jessop, 2002). 
Within this, EBP has been a critical tool to support supply-side measures to improve housing 
affordability. EBP has significant implications for the framing of the underlying causes of 
housing affordability. However, in the formulation of policy responses, its deployment is far 
from the technocratic, depoliticised ideal (Murphy, 2014). Examinations of evidence presented 
within some of these reports have revealed that greater emphasis is placed upon perspectives 
informed more by the wider ideological discourse than quantitative evidence (Gurran and 
Phibbs, 2013). Within the problematisation of planning, the evidence base employs studies that 
suggest planning is a major cause of inelastic or unresponsive supply (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2005; 
Gykouro and Saks, 2008). Housing markets can be slow to respond to increases in demand due 
to lags in housing supply through the length of decision making and in construction. The time 
of response is described as supply elasticity (Glaeser et al., 2008). The elasticity of supply 
determines the length of market bubbles; elastic supply results in new housing coming online 
quickly as prices rise whereas inelastic supply results in longer bubbles and greater volatility 
(Glaeser et al., 2008). Inelasticity of supply can arise from constraints imposed by obvious 
factors such as geographic features or regulatory impediments (Gyourko et al., 2008). High 
levels of planning regulation have been suggested to be a source of higher house prices through 
increased costs or delay (e.g. White and Allmendinger, 2003; Grimes and Aitken, 2010; Ball, 
2010). However, other factors, such as developers’ decisions to release land in response to 
economic incentives to reduce supply, have also been shown to have a considerable effect 
(Guthrie, 2010). 




The literature on planning regulation and the impacts on housing affordability in New Zealand 
adopts a similar position to international studies. Grimes and Laing (2009) examined the effect 
of the Auckland Metropolitan Urban Limit (MUL) on land prices either side of the boundary. 
They determined that the arbitrarily imposed MUL resulted in a price discontinuity between 
land contiguous to the boundary but on either side. Land values for the property just inside the 
MUL were found to be ~10 times higher, suggesting that it was a binding constraint on land 
supply. This study did not, however, attempt to make any correlation between land supply and 
housing. Zheng (2013) presented a continuation of the study by Grimes and Laing (2009), 
arguing that price discontinuities were much higher for land in the lower end of the price 
distribution, impacting upon affordability (Zheng, 2013). The growth in the land price 
discontinuity since the late 1990s infers that the MUL has become an increasing constraint on 
meeting housing demand (Zheng, 2013). Both papers are used extensively in evidence to 
support recommendation within reports on planning (e.g. Ministry for the Environment, 2010; 
Productivity Commission, 2017).  
3.2.2 Summary 
These previous two sections have illustrated how neoliberalism has shaped international 
housing policy and subsequently informed the implementation of HASHA within New 
Zealand. Policy convergence and evidenced-based policy have affected how the issue of 
housing affordability was framed within New Zealand; emphasising regulation which imposes 
artificial supply constraints which impact upon elasticities. This section has informed the 
formulation of the broader housing objectives within New Zealand in Figure 4. Through the 
'roll-out' of policy which prioritises a market-led response, HASHA enables neoliberalism to 
shape our urban spaces in attempting to address housing affordability. 
3.3 Politics and Power 
Politics are implicit within any governance arrangement; thus, they are an essential 
consideration for the implementation of HASHA. As discussed within Section 2.1.1, the 
governance hierarchy within the resource management system allows for the devolved 
decision-making. This hierarchy allows for control of urban development outcomes to largely 
the local level. However, the introduction of HASHA represents a divergence from this 
governance arrangement. Gurran et al., (2014) identify this as a rescaling of state power in the 
centralisation of planning powers through, for example, their ability to impose SHA's upon 
local government. The potential for political agendas to subvert the processes evokes questions 




about the legitimacy of this decision making. Cheyne (2015) supports this position, arguing a 
'democratic deficit' arose from the centralisation and rescaling of power. This deficit has 
important implications for evaluating the implementation of policy on housing affordability, as 
it is inherently political. 
The literature identifies two particularly important political dimensions to this, the first of 
which relates to voting and homeownership. Nicholls (2014) illustrates one side of this in 
Australia, noting that while homeownership rates are declining, the majority of Australians still 
own their own homes. They argue that the implications of this are not lost on the major parties 
of Australia and thus they are ‘disinclined to enact policies that curtail house price inflation’ 
(Nicholls, 2014 pg. 341). Secondly, Adams (2011, pg. 958) argues that ‘although no 
government may ever be able to solve the problem of planning for housing development, each 
will be likely to re-frame that problem to serve the particular interests than in the ascendancy'. 
This position leverages an issue to create political capital and thus power. Beer et al. (2007 pg. 
16) supports this, noting that reform is ‘attractive to governments who need to be seen to be 
responding to housing affordability problems’ without considering the implications of that 
policy. 
The rescaling of state power enables the political positions of central government to be imposed 
upon local government. This rescaling exacerbates the potential of conflicting interventions 
and priorities between central and local government (Murphy, 2015). McArthur (2017) argues 
that tensions arise when addressing environmental and economic issues in post-suburban cities. 
Neoliberalism prioritises econometric performance measures in the age of competitive cities, 
so reconciling these sometimes-adversarial issues can be challenging. Sancton (2006) notes 
that despite the best efforts of cities or lower levels of government to respond to these wider 
issues, they are primarily 'policy-takers' rather than 'policy-makers'. These differing roles can 
lead to an observable gap between local government aspirations and outcomes relating to the 
adoption of sustainable policy as they are at the whim of 'business as usual' policies of central 
government (Chapman et al., 2017).  
The amalgamation of Auckland’s eight authorities into the ‘Super-city’ has provided fertile 
ground to explore the complexities involved in the rescaling of power and competing 
discourses within the New Zealand context. In a move representative of ‘roll-out’ 
neoliberalism, central government imposed its top-down policy stance to provide a globally 
competitive city position which prioritised a more extensive private sector-led regional growth 




project (Lewis and Murphy, 2014). The deployment of this agenda was not uncontested; 
however, as liveability arose as a competing imaginary led from a council that desired bottom-
up governance processes (McArthur, 2017; Lewis and Murphy, 2014). As a conduit between 
the two levels of government, the Mayor attracted criticism for trying to appease both sides 
through engaging in contradictory imaginaries (Lewis and Murphy, 2014). McArthur (2017) 
argues that this treatment of these discourses as complementary has created undesirable trade-
offs at smaller spatial scales as unsustainable modes of urban development continue. Politics 
can, therefore, influence the urban development outcomes from the policy.  
Housing affordability has also been a significant example of the rescaling of power in Auckland 
and New Zealand. In the pursuit of competitiveness, Murphy (2016) argues that pressure to 
address housing affordability and supply was used to challenge long-established powers and 
fundamentally altered the power dynamics between central and local government. 
Compounding this are the relatively weak institutions of local government, inhibiting them 
from addressing many issues (Lewis and Murphy, 2014). Compounding this is the heavy 
reliance upon investment from central government for significant infrastructure.  The rescaling 
of power enabled greater central government intervention and control over policy issues as the 
amalgamation of Auckland into a singular 'super-city' blurred the lines between issues of local 
and national importance (McArthur, 2017). This example highlights the significant discretion 
that the central government has to wade into issues and impose their policy to attain what can 
cynically be called a self-serving result. Murphy (2016) argues the deployment of HASHA to 
address housing affordability exemplifies. In light of this, manoeuvring these changing 
governance and planning spaces can be challenging as ‘local actors must operate tactically and 
strategically in relation to known, anticipated or unexpected central government aspirations 
and constraints’ (Lewis and Murphy, 2014, pg. 105).  
3.4 Planning Policy, Urban Development and Diversity of Supply  
There is an explicit reliance upon the market to deliver housing under the implementation of 
HASHA through the focus on removing supply-side constraints to improve housing supply. 
This section explores how planning regulation and the market interact to deliver housing and 
establishes the grounding for assessing incentivisation later in Section 3.5.  
Regulation controlling urban development for housing impacts upon what the market supplies 
and where (Leishman, 2015). The interactions between the market and planning regulation boil 
down to the impact they have upon the feasibility of the development, as developers must meet 




established profit margins at an initial appraisal stage (Rowley and Phibbs, 2012). If planning 
regulations limit the potential profit, then developers will incorporate this into their profit 
forecasting and their decisions on what to supply and where. Gurran and Bramley (2017) 
provide a simplified example of this, arguing that regulation and subsequent price impacts can 
disincentivise development in certain areas because of design restrictions which make them 
less feasible. This impact can then create a spill over effect where development occurs in other 
areas not subject to the same level of restrictiveness as it offers a higher return on the 
investment (Gurran and Bramley, 2017).  
3.4.1 Market Capacity and Speculative Development   
Feasibility of development extends beyond simple costs of development. Market capacity is 
also a critical step in determining the feasibility of development. Adams et al. (2009) state that 
market capacity has two critical components, price and the ability of homes to be absorbed by 
the market. In evaluating the economic feasibility of development, suppliers begin their 
appraisal by ascertaining the likely selling prices of homes once completed. The selling price 
of the home is affected by the absorption ability of the market, effectively the demand for that 
product (Adams et al., 2009). At its simplest, demand is determined by demographic variables 
such as population, household formation, and household size. However, economic variables, 
such as low-interest rates and consumer values, also influence demand (Golland and 
Boelhouwer, 2002). As economic variables are beyond the control of the consumer, they are 
not relevant for this research. In contrast, values are important as they control the utility values 
that consumers seek from housing. 
Neoclassical economics views of demand for housing assume fixed utility of housing, 
positioning consumers as rational agents who adjust preferences and behaviour to achieve the 
most cost-efficient model (Bayliss et al., 2013). However, assuming fixed utility ignores the 
influence of social and cultural values on housing choice. Bayliss et al. (2013) argue that houses 
are intrinsically linked to the people's lifestyles beyond what other assets are, which is not 
recognised within the fixed utility position. To capture the role of values in housing 
development, Ball (1986) presents an alternative model for demand where social agents define 
the structures of provision. Social agents are those who have in economic relation to the 
physical process of provision itself. Thus, both developers and final users provide the structure 
through which housing development occurs. This structure allows for the incorporation of the 
values of the end consumer to into the process as the utility they seek to obtain from their 
housing asset shapes the structures through which housing is developed (Ball, 1986). 




Consumer values affect feasibility; subsequently, developers must consider the housing utility, 
which is sought by the end consumer within market capacity assessments. In delivering 
alternative housing typologies, this is a critical element as the majority of private housing 
developments are speculative schemes; developers have to assess the product they are 
delivering against the demand (Bramley, 2013). The implication of this is that speculative 
housing schemes will deliver what there is the current demand for as this presents the lowest 
risk profit for the developer (Rowley and Phibbs, 2012). Even if developers desire to meet the 
preferences of prospective buyers of higher density typologies, the risk involved means that 
potential site value uplift from these developments does not sufficiently impact feasibility 
(Sharam et al., 2015). This is largely due to the capital intensity required for these 
developments, which significantly increases the exposure of the investments to risk (Leishman, 
2015). 
Planning regulation and government policy have also been shown to impact the feasibility of 
higher density development typologies. In Australia, Dodson (2010) found that even if local 
policies to encourage more intensive typologies do exist, land prices at the sub-regional level 
will be "insufficient to stimulate the necessary level of investment in high-density housing by 
private market actors" (Dodson, 2010, pg. 496). The effect of this being that while accessible 
greenfield development on the urban periphery will limit brownfield redevelopment potential. 
A higher-level policy can be more impactful on the feasibility of higher-density typologies. 
The research of Golland and Beolhouwer, 2002 has identified that signals from government 
around expectations or plans for housing expansion are important influences on speculative 
development. Drawing evidence from the Netherlands, they argue that the more pro-active role 
of the government in national planning for housing has encouraged greater partnership in 
achieving urban policy objectives and lead to more innovative housing development models 
than the United Kingdom. Other research has also observed this effect. Bramley (2013) found 
that the central government policies which have prioritised large increases in land supply have 
resulted in the excessive areal expansion and incoherent development patterns. 
In New Zealand, literature assessing the development outcomes of policy interventions is 
sparse as most attention is paid to the impacts on housing affordability. However, these can be 
useful for examining the impacts of the incentives offered. Fernandez et al. (2019) argue in the 
production of housing, SHA’s only incentivise one attribute: the rapid delivery of housing. In 
satisfying the demand for housing, the market delivers properties with characteristics that 




satisfy the wants of the consumer. This enables developers to supply the market with the 
products which provided the highest net return, a reflection of Agent Theory. In conjunction 
with a singular focus on housing affordability metrics, this has resulted in land being made 
available often outside of existing city limits which can run counter to the strategic goals of 
councils (McArthur, 2017). 
3.5 Incentivisation and Costs  
This section details how literature frames incentives for urban development for housing; the 
third layer of Figure 4. This will provide an understanding of how incentives and costs are 
related and how costs arise through the regulation of housing development.  
 Policy instruments are implemented to enact a change in either the market or society. Two 
important categories for policy can be identified as they relate to this research: regulatory or 
incentive-based. Regulatory approaches impose an obligation upon individuals or groups, 
while incentive-based approaches involve either the direct distribution of incentives or the 
removal of disincentives for development (Bengston et al., 2004). The common definition of 
incentivisation is the action of motivating or encouraging an outcome. Incentive-based 
approaches to policy do not compel a certain course of action; rather they are a method of 
lowering the costs of that course of action (Bengston et al., 2004). An incentive-based approach 
to policy assumes that individuals are utility maximisers; they will not take action unless 
influenced, encouraged or coerced through tangible payoffs (Schneider and Ingram, 1990). 
Agency Theory highlights this assumption, where agents (developers) can make decisions 
which impact upon others (Vitale, 2010). Agency Theory assumes that agents are selfish and 
rational actors – incentives which offer tangible payoffs appeal to both characteristics as 
calculative agents can assess how this affects their bottom line. Concerning urban development, 
this links to the feasibility of a particular development as incentives become a motivating factor 
in delivering a tangible benefit to the agent in delivering higher profitability (Vitale, 2010). If 
a policy lever is applied to affect the feasibility of development through the lowering of costs, 
providing a tangible payoff, then consequently this is the act of incentivisation. This section 
will assess how costs arise in the interaction between planning and urban development and how 
these costs are classified.  
A common justification for the implementation of the policy is in corrective action to address 
a market failure. The role of regulation within this for urban development centres around its 
use to control negative externalities associated with development. Regulation allows for 




welfare benefits such as the provision of public goods, open space and amenities that would 
generally not occur without public sector involvement (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004). It is 
argued that evaluating the real costs and benefits of development requires the incorporation of 
externalities; otherwise, the development will be artificially cheap (Brueckner, 2009).  If 
negative externalities are not internalised within decision-making, then this is characteristic of 
a market failure1 (Brueckner, 2009). An extension of the principal-agent problem, unregulated 
markets are unlikely to respond to failures in urban development as agents within that market 
obtain the benefits, thus are disincentivised to respond. This is in itself, an argument for the 
role of planning within urban development and has long been the most prominent method of 
mitigating these externalities (Cheshire, 2014; Mclaughlin, 2012).  
3.5.1 Planning and Social Welfare  
This wider rationale for planning is defined using welfare economics and the socially 
inefficient allocation of land and resources under a wholly market-led system (Webster, 1998). 
Whitehead (2007 pg. 26) summarises this role by stating “the objective of having a system at all 
must be to generate different outcomes from that which the market alone would support. As 
such, the role of the planning system is constraining socially undesirable uses”. In this way, 
regulation acts as a method of internalising the externalities that land development generates 
that would otherwise not be (market failure). Webster (1998) presents the diagram found in 
Figure 5 to explain how the socially optimum result is obtained under social welfare 
economics. In simple terms, this figure represents the relationship between the marginal costs 
of producing versus the marginal benefits obtained from the production of a good. D represents 
the price consumers are willing to pay for each additional unit of output, representing the law 
of diminishing returns. S represents the marginal cost of producing one additional unit of output 
for the producer. Under an unregulated market, m is the optimal level of production; however, 
this does not capture the costs which are borne by other people, E. The external costs of 
production are assumed to rise with the level of activity and quantity produced. These are then 
added to the costs of the producer to get S’. This shifts the marginal benefit point for output to 
m’. E is still positive, representing that society will still accept some amount of environmental 
degradation or social cost as the price of progress. 
 
1 Market failures being broadly defined as the free market allocation of goods in a socially undesirable manner 





Figure 5 Externalities of production. Figure sourced from Webster (1998).  
The argument relates to the net costs and benefits of development. Under unfettered market 
conditions, development will occur at a sub-optimal social cost. Under social welfare theory, 
only the government is in the position to apply regulation so that the optimum result is achieved 
(Webster, 1998).  The label of Pigouvian tax is often granted to regulation which seeks to 
achieve the socially optimum result. In relation to this research, the incorporation of such a tax 
in the form of land use regulation increases the market price of land, which, in theory, ensures 
that development only occurs when the market regards it worthwhile (Whitehead, 2007). 
Opponents to the social welfare rationale apply Coasian economics to question whether the 
total cost of government intervention is greater than what an unregulated market would deliver 
(Chung, 1994). Three key issues raised within this field have been identified from literature 
that is relevant to this research. Firstly, social welfare places the focus on outcome efficiency 
over process efficiency. In trying to achieve the socially optimum outcome, it is argued that 
the real costs of the implementation far outweigh the social costs of the externalities (Webster, 
1998). Concerning the delivery of housing, the standard argument is that the inefficiencies of 
decision making imposed by a Pigouvian tax result in a significant burden relating to the 
compliance costs alone (Gurran and Phibbs, 2013). The second issue raised is closely linked to 
the first in that the focus on outcome efficiency of social welfare economics does not have any 




regard to transaction costs incurred through, sometimes, excessive and insensitive 
administration costs of regulation (Webster, 1998). Finally, the concept of a socially optimum 
result is subjective; there is nothing to ensure decision-makers generate 'optimality'. 
Subsequently, the social optimum becomes a political choice (Whitehead, 2007). 
The criticisms of such regulation are captured within transactive cost theory, which adopts a 
focus on process and not outcomes. Transactions in planning are regarded as 'legal action to 
increase (or take) control over property rights' (Buitelaar, 2007 pg. 24). They are generated 
from the interactions between the regulator and the landowner in establishing the user rights 
regime for a specific site or location (i.e. what can be done on that land). Subsequently, 
transactive costs are those which are related to things other than physical production of one 
unit (i.e. construction of housing) (Chung, 1994 p. 84). Transaction costs are closely linked 
with interactions with institutions in the production of a physical good. Institutions emerge 
when the costs of market transactions become higher than the parties involved want to bear, so 
an institution is created to manage the process (Alexander, 1992). Within the context of 
planning these costs are externalities which produce sub-optimal social results (such as 
environmental degradation) in line with traditional social welfare economics. Buitelaar (2007 
pg. 51) applies a simple example of housing development to demonstrate transaction costs: 
“A design is a necessary activity in the production process of a house or a housing 
block… in the deliberation about the design between the municipality and the 
developer, in order for the developer to get planning permission, is part of the 
transaction costs, as are the costs of the negotiation between the developer and the 
architect.” 
Buitelaar (2007) explores the role of institutions and governments in the creation of transaction 
costs for development. He concludes that the level of transaction costs is closely related to the 
level of control that institutions or governments want to exercise over development. This can 
impact upon when the transaction costs occur, as governance that prioritises developmental 
control will incur costs earlier through things such as pre-application meetings. Alexander 
(2001 pg. 68) contends that ‘On the face of it a rigorous public statutory planning and 
development control system should minimise transaction costs that are linked to the hazards of 
uncertainty in the land development process and the property market' although he notes that 
increased regulation does not result in minimal transaction costs through increased 
administration. 




The relative merits of or rationality of planning in this instance are irrelevant. Rather, the 
purpose of this was to establish how theory deals with the imposition of costs upon 
development. The framing the problem of housing affordability as a planning constraint issue 
allows for the costs of planning to be assessed. If the rationale that planning is constraining 
housing supply which is so pervasive through literature is applied (As discussed in Section 
3.2), then the transaction cost theory becomes a useful tool for undertaking heuristic analysis 
to identify how costs are imposed on housing development. This can contribute to evaluating 
how relaxing or removing those constraints would have the effect of incentivising development 
(Buitelaar, 2007).  
3.5.2 Planning Induced Costs: 
Ultimately, any regulation has the potential to increase the price of development. The 
application of transaction theory to planning allows for discrete costs to be identified and 
therefore, how incentives can be offered to housing development (Vitale, 2010). Nunns and 
Rohani (2016) identify two types of transactive costs which relate to specifically to planning: 
Compliance costs which can be classified as direct costs imposed by planning regulatory 
regimes, and Deadweight costs which are related to limits on what can be done with sites and 
costs/uncertainty with applying for development consent.   
3.5.2.1 Compliance Costs 
Compliance costs are a reality of any regulatory system. Within transaction cost theory, these 
accrue through administration, development contributions or any tax applied to value gain of 
planning decisions2 (Brueckner, 2009; Buitelaar, 2007). Additional costs are also imposed 
meeting design requirements included within regulatory plans such as balcony and car park 
requirements (Nunns and Rohani, 2016). These compliance costs have been identified within 
a significant amount of international literature as contributors to increased house prices as they 
contribute to the 'regulatory tax' on development (Glaeser et al., 2005). It is essential to 
recognise, however, that many other variables are also involved with increasing prices, such as 
the decision of developers to delay maximising their return from housing bubbles (Guthrie, 
2010). Much of the quantitative literature addressing the relationship between compliance costs 
and housing supply has been set in the United States with a strong preference for the 
mainstream economic focus of outcomes and end states, i.e. house prices (White and 
Allmendinger, 2003). Within the United States, this regulatory tax related to compliance costs 
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has been identified as a contributor to decreases in housing supply in heavily regulated urban 
environments (Quigley and Raphael, 2005). Additionally, Ihlanfeldt (2007) found that high 
compliance costs were associated with increases in the average floor size of new dwellings, 
concluding that this occurred because developers most likely felt that they could more easily 
shift regulatory costs on homebuyers for larger dwellings. 
An important component of compliance costs which have been identified within the literature 
is the costs induced by planning delay for urban development (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001; Ball, 
2010). Two distinct delay induced costs have been identified. The first is simply planning 
induced delay for development induces additional costs for things like professional service fees 
and processing fees and for things such as the timing of receipts (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). 
The second is the uncertainty in delay times, which change drastically change the structure of 
market supply – meaning that delay may reduce the profitability of development if the supply 
of housing increases during the delay period (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). 
Within New Zealand, limited research exists which directly addresses compliance costs. 
Grimes and Mitchell (2015) surveyed developers within the Auckland area and found that 
compliance costs differed for development types. Apartment compliance costs were mostly 
associated with delays, building height limits, balcony requirements, floor to ceiling heights 
and mix of apartment typologies. For residential sections and standalone housing, compliance 
costs were mostly associated with infrastructure contributions, section size requirements, 
delays and urban design considerations. It is important to note that these costs were self-
reported by developers. 
In illustrating compliance costs within the New Zealand Context, Nunns and Rohani (2016) 










Table 2: Examples of compliance costs sourced from Nunns and Rohani (2016) 
Hypothetical Example Potential Compliance Costs 
Obtaining a discretionary resource consent 
for a new development requires additional 
fees and consultant reports and results in 
delays to construction. 
The development proceeds, but the cost 
per dwelling is higher than it otherwise 
would have been. These costs will tend to 
be passed on to households or landowners 
Minimum parking rules require all 
developments to supply parking based on a 
"one-size-fits-all" rule that over provides 
for some businesses and households 
The development proceeds, but the cost 
per dwelling is higher than it otherwise 
would have been. Some households (or 
businesses) are required to purchase cars 
that they do not value. 
 
3.5.2.2 Deadweight Costs  
The establishment of a user rights regime for a site is a negotiation between an institution and 
the owner of the site. In an unregulated market, developers seek to maximise the potential rent 
increase from that land, i.e. the optimal development.  However, through the establishment of 
the user rights regime, the owner accepts a reduction in their property rights and thus a 
reduction in what they can then develop on that site (Buitelaar, 2007). These are classified as 
deadweight costs as the negotiation of a user rights regime caps the potential rent increase for 
that land. Importantly, this can also impact upon the probability of development as the market 
will only deliver housing if the value of the development exceeds the value of costs involved 
with development (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). Neoclassical economic theory states that if land 
value is high, developers will seek to minimise land area per unit to maximise the marginal 
rent increase that can be gained from development (Whitehead, 2007). An extreme example of 
deadweight costs can be found in the examinations of the pricing effects of urban growth 
boundaries (UGB). Grimes and Liang (2009) assess the effect of the UGB for Auckland, the 
Metropolitan Urban Limit (MUL) on land prices on either side, finding that land inside the 
MUL has a value per hectare is approximately ten times that of land just outside the boundary. 
Another form of imposing deadweight cost is in the use of inclusionary zoning. In addressing 
housing affordability, the use of inclusionary zoning has often been used for new 
developments. This represents a transactional cost in the establishment of the user rights 
regime; in obtaining planning approval for a development of market-priced dwellings, 
developers can be required to provide a certain number of 'affordable' dwellings (de Kam, 
Needham and Buitelaar, 2014). The use of this tool is widespread, particularly where the 




regulatory system enables negotiations between developers and authorities (Gurran and 
Whitehead, 2011). The deadweight cost of these units can be recouped to a certain degree 
through the sales of other market-priced units (and other cost offsetting measures at the 
discretion of the council) however it still imposes a limit on the potential revenue of the 
development (Calavita and Grimes, 1998).  
Uncertainty in planning decisions has also identified as contributing to deadweight costs. It 
impacts the decision to develop by incentivising developers to wait while more certainty is 
obtained or by impacting the type of development which is submitted for approval (Mayo and 
Sheppard, 2001). The regulatory style employed exerts influence over the level of uncertainty 
experienced by applicants. Theoretically, planning regimes with codified standards will reduce 
uncertainty as there are clear tests for whether a development will be given permission to 
proceed (Buitelaar, 2007). However, this can increase early transaction costs through the high 
degree of detail required for plans given approval at this stage; though this can be negated 
through the use of pre-application meetings between developers and authorities (Buitelaar, 
2007). 
Options Model for Housing Development  
Grimes and Mitchell (2015) present a model to understand how uncertainty affects 
development outcomes through influencing developers’ decisions to apply for resource 
consent. The decision to apply for resource consent will only occur at the first stage if and only 
if the value of the expected value of the project is positive. The determinants of this value are 
the duration of the consent process. Delays influence the probability of development due to 
market volatility through the potential for additional market supply to depress the realised 
project value (Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). If the uncertainty introduced in this process makes 
the expected project value negative, then a deadweight cost has been imposed. After granting 
the consent, planning can still influence the discount rate, r1, as it is a function of the expected 
length of development. The expected length is inflated through additional consultation 
requirements on plans or monitoring requirements. 
3.5.3 Summary 
The review of the literature has identified that planning imposes transaction costs upon 
development. These transactive costs can either be direct compliance costs or deadweight costs 
through the negotiation of the user rights regime. Reducing these costs can act as an incentive 




for development. The following transactive costs have been identified through the literature 
review as they relate to the New Zealand planning system. 
Table 3: Summary table of identified transaction costs from literature arising from planning generally and specifically to 
New Zealand 
Transaction Costs Imposed by Planning Regulation 
Transaction Cost Type Cost Description 
Compliance Application Fee The direct cost of application 
Processing Fees The cost associated with 
processing such as 
administrative and hearing 
costs 
Development Contributions Fees imposed for the public 
provision of infrastructure 
Specific Zoning Requirements  Required features such as 
balconies for multilevel 
buildings or carparks 
Delay The additional cost imposed 
by delay such as professional 
fees 
Deadweight Zoning Limits on what can be 
developed at that site 
Consent Conditions Requirements for the 
development limiting certain 
features 
Zone Performance Standards Limits to what can be 
developed on that site 
Inclusionary Zoning Requirements for affordable 
dwellings reducing revenue 
Uncertainty Refer to Options Model for 
Housing Development  
 
3.6 Urban Development Typologies  
Built form indicators must be employed to objectively assess the contribution of policy 
implementation on urban form at the local government level to achieve the aim of the research. 
This section will explore how literature approaches this to extract a framework for evaluating 
the housing development typologies will have been consenting under HASHA in the NUA.   
Urban form is the outcome of the dynamic process of urban development. It refers to a static 
measure of properties/characteristics of a city for a given point in time (Schwarz, 2010). Often, 




these properties are indicators of the spatial structure of cities (Lowry and Lowry, 2014) related 
to land use patterns, transportation systems, and urban design, which contribute to the urban 
form of a place (Handy, 1996). While there is no consistent definition of urban form within the 
literature, several papers operationalise the term along similar lines (e.g., Jabareen, 2006; Tsai, 
2005) 
Urban form as a concept has existed since early theorists such as Ebenezer Howard and Frank 
Lloyd Wright, who sought to design their respective idealised urban landscapes of the Garden 
City and Broadacre City. Both of these theories identified specific desirable characteristics of 
urban areas and applied them in the development of their visions. As technological, economic, 
and political changes spread the suburban landscape across the globe, characterising urban 
form became a method of contrasting this urban landscape with more sustainable ideas for land 
consumption (Huang, Lu, and Sellers, 2007). There are well-established arguments for more 
compact urban form, ranging from the benefits of energy savings, accessibility, and the 
conservation of rural land (Burton, 2002). 
Urban form is most often measured through quantitative measures of the efficiency of land use. 
Of these quantitative measures, the most employed measure is density as it can characterise the 
patterns of land consumption (Tsai, 2005). There is considerable debate about the 
representativeness of density measures, however, as critics argue that consideration of the 
number alone ignores contextual factors about the design of the built form to achieve these 
densities (e.g., Burton, 2002; Pont and Haupt, 2007). Commonly measures of density are based 
upon per capita occupancy of land, but this does not consider other variables such as household 
size or changes in floor area (Pont and Haupt, 2007). To counter this, measures of density are 
in terms of dwellings per areal unit – typically dwellings per hectare. The usefulness of this 
lies in how dwellings per areal unit can capture changes in the predominant housing type 
(Burton, 2002). By capturing this change, it enables the use of dwellings per area unit as a 
proxy for the compactness of an urban area (Burton, 2002). In relation to urban development 
for housing, density is a valuable measure of the land consumed to support urban growth (Hasse 
and Lathrop, 2003). Generally, higher density values indicate more efficient use of that land. 
As land is a limited resource, the density of development within urban areas is a core concern 
(Hasee and Lathrop, 2003). Furthermore, increasing the density of development improves the 
efficiency of providing servicing infrastructure through economies of scale and density (Adams 
and Chapman, 2016).  




The criticisms of density measures of urban form highlight its context-specific nature. For 
dwelling density to be a meaningful measure, values need to correspond to descriptors about 
the predominant housing typologies (Burton, 2002). Research on urban form in the New 
Zealand context highlights the predominance of housing that has been detached dwellings on 
large sites – the quarter-acre model until the late twentieth century (Dixon and Dupuis, 2003). 
In larger centres, alternative housing typologies were in the form of 1-2 storey 'brick and tile' 
flats providing several dwellings on the quarter-acre section (Bryson and Allen, 2017). New 
Zealand has become strongly urbanised in the interceding period, and new development 
typologies have become more abundant. The literature on urban form in New Zealand has 
focused on Auckland through the lens of a theory of urban form and development. Dixon and 
Dupuis (2003) is an example of this, as they explore urban intensification and its relationship 
to the principles of new urbanism in Auckland. However, as urban intensification has spread 
across the country, taxonomies and definitions have been developed, which related density 
measures to housing typologies in the New Zealand context. The two most applicable to this 
research are Ghosh and Vale (2009) and Bryson and Allen (2017). These will be unpacked to 
develop definitions of housing typologies that are related to density measures for the research. 
The spatial scale of measures of housing density is an essential consideration in the application 
of the measure. Bryson and Allen (2017) identify two main approaches to this. The first is in 
the application of a definition for density based upon the housing typological characteristics 
present at the scale of an individual dwelling or building within a housing development. The 
Ministry for the Environment (2012) provides an example of the typology approach in their 
definition of medium density housing:   
“multi-unit developments with an average site area density of less than 350 m2 per 
unit. It can include detached (or stand-alone), semi-detached (or duplex), terraced or 
low rise apartments on either single sites or aggregated sites, or as part of larger 
master-planned developments.” 
The second approach is a neighbourhood-based measure of density. The neighbourhood 
approach acknowledges that multiple housing typologies exist within an area unit. Therefore, 
obtaining an average at a larger scale is more indicative of the overall urban form of the area 
(Ghosh and Vale, 2009). The context and setting are important, as straight calculations of 
neighbourhood density to define densities mean different things as scale change from regional 
settings to major urban areas (Bryson and Allen, 2017). Ultimately the scale of the density 
measurement is to be derived from becomes the deciding factor in the choice of approach. 




Neighbourhood scale measures of density are going to be less valuable than typological 
descriptors for individual developments. Conversely, typological descriptors are less 
transferable to neighbourhood or city scale comparisons.  
Acknowledging the importance of scale, Ghosh and Vale (2009) adopt a hybrid measure with 
their NZ Urban Taxonomy framework. For instance, this framework differentiates between 
suburban form descriptions and inner-city form descriptions. This treatment enables 
differential neighbourhood dwelling densities to be set for different contexts by providing a 
supporting typological description. This framework proposes form descriptions for low, 
medium, and high-density areas (Table 4). The combination of scale, typological descriptions 
and gross density measures make this taxonomy suitable for use in this research to evaluate 
urban development for housing in the NUA.  
3.7 Summary  
This Chapter has provided an extensive review of the background literature that relates to the 
research question and objectives. The pervasiveness of neoliberalism and how it shapes spaces 
and policy has had a significant influence on interventions and responses to housing 
affordability. Through the reliance on the market, this ideology is predisposed to introducing 
the supply-side policy in an attempt to counter housing price bubbles by improving the 
elasticity of supply. Conceptualising these interventions within transaction cost economic 
theory allows for the evaluation of the mechanisms of implementation and subsequently 
incentivisation. Relying upon agent theory, this assumes that developers are rational actors who 
seek to maximise the potential benefit or profit that they can obtain from an investment.   




Table 4: New Zealand Urban Taxonomy framework with typological descriptions and gross dwelling density measures for 









Single-family single or double-storeyed detached large houses 
dispersed; ample open spaces around the houses; large lot 
sizes; significant amount of available productive land for food 
production; very good tree canopy and grass cover and less 
pavement areas 
Low; 15 du/ha or 
below; far away from 
CBD, at the urban 




Single-family single/double storeyed detached/semi-attached 
large/ medium houses built close to each other; moderate 
open spaces around the houses; medium to smaller lot sizes; 
limited amount of available productive land for food 
production; older areas have a good tree canopy cover but 
new development have comparatively less or no tree canopy 
cover; water collection from municipal supply; larger paved/ 
impervious areas and longer driveways 
Medium; 15+ to 25 
du/ha; moderate 







Two to four-storeyed attached/semi attached medium/small 
size housing units or apartments; almost no natural open 
space and vegetation; recreated landscaped courts; significant 
impervious areas for driveways and parking; shared services 
High; 25+ to 40 du/ha; 
at close distance to any 







Two to seven-storeyed medium/small size attached/semi-
attached housing units or residential apartments; very limited 
natural open spaces and vegetation; recreated landscaped 
courts; significant impervious areas for driveways and parking; 
shared services 
 
High; 40+ to 80 du/ha; 




Above seven-storeyed/ multi-storeyed sky scrapers with 
medium/small size residential apartments; no natural open 
spaces and vegetation; recreated landscaped courts at ground 
or upper levels, roof gardens; very high impervious areas at 
ground; covered parking at basement or ground; shared 
services 
High; 80+ du/ha; 
within or very close to 
the CBD 





This chapter establishes the research methodology that has been designed to address the 
research aim of evaluating the urban development for housing from the implementation of 
HASHA within the NUA. This study employed a mixed-methods approach combing 
qualitative study based on interviews with key informants and document analyses with 
quantitative geographic information systems (GIS) analysis. This chapter will outline the 
overall approach of these methods, which elicited the results of the research.   
4.1 Research Philosophy  
Assessing the implementation of HASHA, and government policy more generally, is inherently 
political. Perspectives on this topic can be highly subjective based on an individual's personal 
views. Despite the best efforts of individuals, personal experiences with other areas of 
government or politics can profoundly impact how these views are transferred to the 
professional sphere. This transfer is significant as data for this research was sourced from 
participants in their professional capacity. In light of this, the current research is approached 
from a critical perspective under Habermas's taxonomy of research approaches (Kitchin and 
Tate, 2000). This approach aims to understand the mechanisms through which outcomes are 
observed. Implicit within this is the need for reflexivity as this approach is subjective (Bryman, 
2012). The recognition of this violates the assumption of objectivity that is pushed within 
positivist research and can influence how that knowledge was obtained (Harraway, 1988). 
Adopting this perspective requires the acknowledgement of the influence of situated 
knowledges; ‘knowledge is the product of specific embodied knowers located in specific places 
and spaces’ (Mansvelt and Berg, 2010 pg. 338). Therefore, the researcher must be accountable 
to their position, and it is crucial to recognise the politics of their own and the participants' 
position in the research process. 
The subjective and political nature of the topic necessitates the understanding of the structures 
at work that generate specific outcomes. The multi-level governance model creates structures 
through which HASHA is implemented to generate observable urban development outcomes 
and patterns. Critical realism lends itself to the research as it is concerned with identifying these 
structures and subsequently, the context in which they exist (Bryman, 2012). Critical realism 
holds that we can only understand the observed world if we can identify the structures at work 
which generate these observations. This position extends to the identification of causal 




mechanisms and the empirical regularity of the phenomenon (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). 
Realism, through the identification of causal mechanisms, allows for human agency to be 
incorporated as it recognises that individuals make their own decisions within a structure that 
they may be unaware of (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). The use of this methodology allows for an 
understanding of the urban development outcomes as multiple actors are involved in delivering 
housing. Both local and central government are involved in the implementation of HASHA, 
therefore under critical realism, the political and power structures which exist have influenced 
these outcomes. These structures then shape the market delivery of housing.  
4. 2 Research Approach 
Addressing the research question and objectives requires this study to adopt a mixed-method 
approach known as triangulation to elicit appropriate data. This combined qualitative research 
involving document analysis of regulatory plans, policy and resource consents and key 
informant interviews, with quantitative geographic information systems analysis. This mixed-
method approach utilizes triangulation as a method of improving the validity of the overall 
study through corroboration obtained from the different methodologies (Bryman, 2012). The 
main deployment of triangulation is for convergent validation between different sources of 
qualitative and quantitative data. Triangulation as a method has evolved to embody research 
which employs data to ‘not necessarily enhance validity but can extend the scope and depth of 
understanding’ (Fielding, 2012 pg. 128). Employing triangulation in this sense will aide in 
either validating or expanding the perspective of key informants on the implementation of 
HASHA to identifying the key trends of housing development in the NUA. Conversely, 
triangulation will enable complex dynamics to be captured within qualitative research which 
may not be apparent in a solely quantitative approach. It is on the strength of this that the 
mixed-method approach was adopted for this research. Bryman (2012) presents a classification 
of mixed methods research based on two criteria: priority and sequence. Priority is what the 
principal data-gathering tool will be, and sequence is the method which precedes which. This 
study prioritises qualitative methods which will occur first. The qualitative methods employed 
occupy a subsidiary role to complement and enhance the overall quality of the research. 
4.2.1 Case Study Approach 
Case study research allows the study to undertake an intensive examination of the setting, 
implementation and the outputs of central government policy in the Nelson Urban Area. This 
case was selected as it fulfils several criteria. Firstly, HASHA has been implemented through 




the signing of housing accords in 2015. Secondly, this area provides the regional city example 
for examining the implementation of HASHA. Thirdly, the NUA is experiencing strong 
population growth and subsequent challenges to accommodate that growth. Finally, the dual 
administration of this area by the NCC and TDC enables comparisons between the local 
government implementation of HASHA. Thus, the NUA provides a suitable context for 
answering the research question and objectives. 
Case-study research assumes that the ability to undertake in-depth research on one instance or 
case is valuable on its own without understanding how it manifests in other cases (Baxter, 
2010). This assumption has received criticism due to case studies not being generalizable; the 
findings from case studies are not able to be transferred due to contextual factors (Bryman, 
2012).  However, the selection and representation of the case study approach can negate this. 
The case study approach used for this study is representative or exemplifying case study. This 
approach entails the selection of a case, the NUA, because it is known to have implemented 
policy, HASHA, which can epitomize a broader category of cases or provide a suitable context 
for research questions to be answered (Bryman, 2012).  A requirement for the in-depth analysis 
of a case is that multiple methods and sources of data are used to improve the credibility and 
validity of the approach (Berg and Lune, 2012). 
4.3 Positionality 
As the research is approached from a critical perspective, the positionality of the researcher 
must be acknowledged to understand the situatedness of knowledge and how this may influence 
the research outcomes. As a student of the planning profession, I have an understanding of the 
difficulties or implementing a policy which addresses the housing and more generally urban 
development. Policy directly impacts upon people, and often these impacts are felt unequally. 
I acknowledge that urban development is a political issue through the lens of housing 
affordability. In all likelihood I will look to become a homeowner myself in the near future, so 
following the debates around housing affordability has endowed me with a significant level of 
scepticism of the potential impact of these policies when coupled with an awareness of the 
underlying ideology for these policies. My positionality will be managed through an evaluation 
of the results which is informed solely by the objective framework established from academic 
literature. This will ensure that my own perspectives are not elucidated through the findings of 
this research.  




 4.4 Research Methods 
This research made use of several primary and secondary research methods within the broader 
mixed methods approach of triangulation. The methods are chosen to ensure that the research 
aim and objectives were achieved. Methods used included qualitative content analysis, semi-
structured interviews, and quantitative GIS analysis. These methods will be explored and 
justified below. 
4.4.1 Document Content Analysis 
Document analysis was used to generate both primary and secondary data for the research. 
Document analysis is the 'careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a 
particular body of material in effect to identify patterns, themes, biases and meanings' (Berg 
and Lune, 2012). This research adopts a directed content analysis approach described in Hsieh 
and Shannon (2005). The use of this approach allows for both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to be undertaken as this research will not employ a solely manifest content analysis 
which limits analysis to those elements which are physically present through the text (Berg and 
Lune, 2012). Rather, this approach allows for latent analysis and more interpretative reading 
to be undertaken as required.  
Primary Research 
Document analysis was undertaken on the available resource consent applications and 
decisions for developments consented under HASHA within the NUA to address the third 
research objective. This analysis required the use of prior research and the literature review to 
establish what the pertinent information and in these documents would be. This analysis was 
undertaken to extract the information which enabled typological measures of urban 
development to be derived.  
Secondary Research 
Document analysis was undertaken on a selection of local government plans and policies from 
the NCC and TDC which regulate housing development outside of the HASHA process. This 
analysis involved the use of existing theory or prior research relevant to the focus of this study 
to derive a code which was then applied to the text to derive data for this study. This research 
was undertaken to establish the regulatory framework under the RMA under which housing 
development occurs typically. 
Limitations 




It is essential to acknowledge that there are limitations to this approach. Deriving a code from 
theory can introduce an informed bias to the research. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) note that 
researchers are more likely to find supportive evidence and potentially ignore contextual 
aspects. This was managed in two ways. By using critical realism, the researcher will be 
accountable to the potential for this bias. The nature of the documents analysed also limited the 
potential for this bias as they are not interpretive, instead they establish a clear regulatory 
framework with rules and standards. 
4.4.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants as a primary research method. 
Research interviews were employed as they can: fill knowledge gaps that other methods 
cannot; investigate complex behaviours and motivations; collect a diversity of meaning, 
opinion, and experiences; empowers informants and provides an opportunity to reflect upon 
their experiences (Dunn, 2010). This technique relies upon the researcher using a prepared list 
of questions or topics within an interview guide but allowing the interviewee leeway to answer 
the question how they choose (Bryman, 2012). The interview guide prepared is included as 
Appendix B.  
This technique emphasises the role of the researcher as a facilitator, redirecting the interview 
if it has moved too far off-topic and employing different question types (e.g. Probing, follow 
up, direct) to elicit answers or further information (Dunn, 2010). The nature of this technique 
means that bias can be introduced in response to prompts or leading questions of the researcher. 
The use of established questions guides mitigated some of this potential bias as all participants 
were asked the same set of questions. Researcher neutrality was maintained through the 
duration of all interviews to mitigate bias and ensure the credibility of the data collected. 
Interviews were conducted with individuals who had experienced the process of implementing 
central government policy or the result of implementation. Informants were drawn from both 
public and private sectors to obtain the required depth and diversity of opinion/experiences. 
Key informants were identified from publicly available documents and then the snowball 
sampling technique allowed for further informants to be identified. Interviews were either 
conducted face to face or via phone call. Table 5 lists the informants and their backgrounds.  
Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured method using the list of prepared questions 
as a guide for all interviews. Points raised within their answers were explored in detail 
depending on how the interview progressed; some participants freely elaborated on answers 




while others required follow up questions. Interviews were recorded with the permission of the 
participants and were later transcribed into text. Quotes from these transcripts appear in the 
results and are where wider themes were derived. 
Table 5:Coded list of interview participants and their positions.  
Informant Position 
KI1 Council Planner 
KI2 Council Planner 






Several matters relating to ethics were considered for this research. The research gained ethical 
approval from the University. Bryman (2012) outlines the following principles that need to be 
considered for any social research: whether there is harm to participants; whether there is a 
lack of informed consent; whether there is an invasion of privacy; and whether deception is 
involved. The information sheet and consent form in Appendix A were prepared according to 
these principles. The conditions within these forms reflect this. It was ensured that informants 
were supplied with or understood that: information on the research topic and what they would 
be asked to do; that participation in the research was voluntary; that they retained the right to 
anonymity and to withdraw from the research; what would occur with the information they 
provided and data storage. 
4.4.3 GIS Quantitative Methods  
GIS analysis was as a primary research method to obtain patterns of housing development for 
the ten years prior to the implementation of HASHA in the NUA. This enabled the third 
research objective to be addressed by generating a baseline dataset for average lot size, 
dwelling density and building coverage. The scale of this task through the volume of data 
generated made GIS a suitable tool. Janelle and Goodchild (2011) state that GIS allows the 
integration of empirical analysis with broader qualitative analysis when trying to identify 
spatial patterns. Data for this analysis was sourced from Land Information New Zealand’s Data 
Service and the Statistics New Zealand Data. The following data sets downloaded from these 




services were the NZ Property Titles, NZ Building Outlines, NZ Street Address (Electoral), 
and Urban Area 2017 (generalised version). Additional zone data from resource management 
plans was sourced from the NCC and TDC. The methodology for this research was developed 
by the author to generate metrics identified within the literature as appropriate for measuring 
housing development typologies and wider urban form within the NUA. These were the 
average lot size, dwelling density, and building coverage. The steps followed for this analysis 
can be categorised into the following: data acquisition, data transformation, data analysis. The 
latter two steps will be explored below.  
Data Transformation  
New spatial datasets were required to obtain the relevant information for this research. The 
desired data output from this process was all residential property titles created within the NUA 
between 2005 and 2014 to be associated with the relevant zone of the resource management 
plan. The data sources contained data for all New Zealand, so required filtering to the research 
area. Additional filtering was required to identify unit titles, titles containing multiple 
dwellings, and property titles associated with things like road reserves. Figure 6 and Figure 7 
display the data flows which describe the steps performed to obtain the desired output data.  
Data Analysis  
The data analysis required the filtering of the data generated within the transformation and the 
calculation of average lot size, dwelling density and building coverage. The titles created 
during this period were filtered, as several very large titles within the unurbanized portions of 
residential zones are yet to be developed. As this is not indicative of development patterns, title 
areas filtered by interquartile range using the following equation where Q3 is the third quartile 
of the area data and IQR is the interquartile range: 
𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 ≥ 4 × (𝑄3 + 1.5 × 𝐼𝑄𝑅) 
This is an adaptation of the standard interquartile range outlier test, where the factor of 4 was 
adopted from limited 'ground truthing' sampling using aerial and satellite imagery to establish 
which larger titles had dwellings constructed on them. This equation suggests that titles of an 
area greater than 6111.5m2 are to be treated as outliers.  Leasehold and unit titles must also be 
incorporated to estimate true equivalent dwelling density from development during this period, 
as these contain attached dwelling types. Leasehold or cross lease titles are often used where 
there are multiple dwellings in private ownership on one title, and either the land is held in a 




different freehold title (leasehold) or where multiple people own an undivided share of that title 
(cross lease). Where multiple units on one title were identified, the net area for the underlying 
title was divided by the number of dwellings on it. This enabled the calculating of values for 
average lot size, dwelling density, and building coverage which are reflective of the actual 
residential development patterns in the NUA. Dwelling density was calculated for each zone 
by summing up the area of all lots within the zone and dividing it by the total number of lots. 
Building coverage was derived from building outline polygon area divided by the lot polygon 
area.  
Limitations 
A limitation of this study is in the accuracy of the primary data. For instance, the NZ Building 
Outlines dataset originates from the latest aerial imagery. These outlines were generated from 
an automated image classification. This introduces an element of error; however, where 
anomalous outlines were observed, these were ground truthed using publicly available satellite 
imagery from Google. Additionally, imagery for some parts of Nelson was not available at a 










Figure 7: Data flow diagram representing the data transformation for the GIS Analysis for the TDC area of the NUA.





This chapter has outlined the methods for the present study. The research was approached from 
a position of critical realism recognising the political and subjective nature of policy regarding 
urban development for housing. The research approach has been designed to evaluate urban 
development for housing that has been incentivised from the implementation of HASHA at 
local government level in the NUA. Using triangulation will enable convergent validation of 
the results obtained using a mixed methods approach. The report content analysis of plans and 
policy and GIS analysis will be used to establish the baseline for housing development 
delivered under the RMA. This will be compared to the results of the content analysis on the 
resource consents and decisions made under HASHA. In conjunction with the results from the 
interviews, these will establish how HASHA has incentivised those outcomes. Thus, the results 
of the content analysis, interviews, and GIS analysis will be compared to establish what urban 
development for housing has been incentivised. The following three chapters will present the 
results from undertaking this research process.  




5 Research Area 
This chapter presents an overview of the research area in three parts. The first provides an 
introduction to the NUA and the current growth challenges relating to the urban development 
for housing. This part includes an examination of the current demand for housing typologies. 
The second part will contain the policy analysis of the relevant policy documents from the NCC 
and the TDC which regulate urban development for housing.  
5.1 Nelson Urban Area 
Statistics New Zealand defines the NUA as including all of the Nelson territorial areas except 
the Whangamoa area and the main Richmond urban areas, including Hope and Appleby (See 
Figure 8). The administrative duties of the NUA are shared by two administrative bodies: 
Nelson City Council (NCC) and Tasman District Council (TDC).  
The Nelson/Whakatū Urban Area is located on the eastern shores of Tasman Bay. The area has 
a long history of settlement by early Māori dating back 700 years (Walrond, 2015). European 
settlements occurred after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, with the first settlers 
of the New Zealand Company arriving in 1841 led by Arthur Wakefield. Development of 
Nelson centred around a natural harbour in the lee of the Boulder Bank. The Nelson City area 
is geographically constrained, sitting against the foothills of several mountain ranges. The lack 
of productive land led settlers southwest to the Waimea Plains, beginning where Richmond sits 
today. This land has proven to be highly productive, with land converted to intensive uses such 
as horticulture, viticulture and farming. 
Urban development patterns in this area reflect growth occurring on the urban periphery with 
some infill and intensification occurring, historically due to the large sections from the original 
surveying of the region (Wilson, 2011). This intensification has occurred around town centres 
and transport nodes, but not at a density sufficient to support optimal use of these services 
(Nelson City Council, 2013). Urban expansion in Nelson has been focused mostly on the 
southern suburbs including Stoke, Saxton, Enner Glynn while recent plan changes have 
enabled urban development in the Marsden Valley (See Figure 9 for suburb locations). For 
Richmond, much of the urban expansion has been concentrated in East Richmond and 








Figure 9: Suburbs of the Nelson Urban Area. Data sourced from Land Information New Zealand.




5.1 .2 Growth Challenges and Housing Accords 
The wider Nelson Tasman region is known as the sunbelt for its mild winters and sunny skies 
with many recreational opportunities and high amenity values. The NUA has a combined 
estimated population of 67,600.The National Policy Statement on Urban Development 
Capacity classifies this area as a medium growth urban area based upon cumulative projected 
population increases of greater than 5% over the next ten years (Figure 10) 
 




 This area is very attractive for in-migration, particularly from older age groups and retirees. In 
2013, 21.4% of the population was aged 65 or over compared to 14.3% nationally, and this is 
only projected to widen further (Figure 11) as projections show continued growth within the 
65+ demographic. This has had implications for housing supply, as the average household size 
is 2.5 people below the national average of 2.7 ( Nelson City Council, 2016). Furthermore, the 
increasing size of the aging population is also associated in changes in demand for housing, as 
smaller dwellings (units and townhouses) or lifestyle units are preferred (Tasman District 
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Figure 11: Nelson Urban Area population projections from 2013 to 2043 by age. Data sourced from Statistics New Zealand. 
 
Intending to improve housing affordability within their districts, both the NCC and TDC signed 
Housing Accords with the Government in 2015 and subsequently extended in 2017 and runs 
through till 2021. Both Accords established targets for increasing the housing supply within 
their territories through several priority actions. Table 6 presents a summary of actions to which 
both parties agreed to within these accords. Notable differences are the Nelson specific 
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Table 6: Actions and objectives included within the Housing Accords for both Nelson City Council and Tasman District 
Councils. Source: Authors research (2019). 
Action 
Council 
Nelson City Council Tasman District Council 




Increase Developer Confidence 
  
Better Align infrastructure 
investment and private sector 
housing development 
  
Encourage Affordable Homes 
 
 
Encourage developers to subdivide, 
prepare the land, and build houses 
  
Encourage a mix of housing types at 
different price points 
  
Maintain a supply of appropriately 
zoned land 
  
Encourage Infill or redevelopment of 
higher density 
  
Progress plan reviews or changes to 
promote greater housing choice 
  
 
Both Councils received numerous SHA applications, with the first being processed by the NCC 
in December 2015 and by TDC in June 2017. No further applications for SHA will be received 
or considered by either Council following the relevant sections of HASHA being repealed by 
the current Government in 2019. For this research, only those SHA which have subsequently 
been granted resource consent are considered. 
5.1.3 Housing Occupancy and Demand  
Establishing the baseline housing occupancy, demand, and supply for the Nelson Urban Area 
is an essential contextual component of this research. As the delivery of housing is a market-
led activity, demand needs to exist for higher density typologies to be delivered. This baseline 




enables comparisons to be drawn from the implementation of policy and to assess what urban 
development for housing has been incentivised. The trends of occupancy and delivery explored 
within this section have occurred under the normal resource consent and regulatory system.  
Statistics New Zealand collected housing type occupancy during the 2013 census. Separate 
dwellings are individual houses on individual sections while attached dwellings include flats, 
apartments or townhouses which either share a wall or a property title. Table 7 below displays 
the distribution of residents in attached or separate dwellings, with the majority of residents in 
the NUA residing in separate dwellings. A higher percentage of residents within the NCC 
reside in attached dwelling typologies. 
Table 7: Number of residents in separate or attached dwelling types in 2013. Data sourced from Statistics New Zealand. 
 
Number of Residents in Private Dwelling Type 
Separate Dwellings (Percent) 
 
Attached Dwellings (Flats, 
Townhouses, Apartments) 
(Percent) 
Nelson 36981 (87.1%) 5481 (12.9%) 
Richmond 12925 (92.1%) 1110 (7.9%) 
NUA 49906 (88.3%) 6591 (11.7%) 
 
Of those residents who occupy attached dwellings, 81.3% are either in single or two-person 
households, which is typical for smaller dwellings. With an aging population, the demand for 
different dwelling types and thus, development typologies must also be considered. The 
proportion of residents aged 65 or older in attached dwellings is much higher than other 
demographics for the NUA at 17.3% (Table 8 below). 
Table 8:Percent of age groups living in separate or attached dwellings in the Nelson Urban Area. Data sourced from Statistics 
New Zealand. 
Age 
Percent in Separate 
Dwellings 
Percent in Attached 
Dwellings 
0-14 91.9% 8.1% 
15-39 86.6% 13.4% 
40-64 90.2% 9.8% 
65+ 82.7% 17.3% 
 




Building consent data from across the NCC and TDC was accessed from Statistics New 
Zealand. While not limited to the Nelson Urban Area, they provide an indication of the number 
and size of dwellings which the market had been delivering prior to the signing of the housing 
accords in 2015 for both districts.  
The previous 10-year period saw an average of 254.5 separate dwellings in the TDC and 200.3 
separate dwellings in the NCC being issued with building consent a year for this period (Figure 
12). The number of dwellings issued with building consent in Nelson dropped significantly in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007-08.  
 
 
Figure 12: Number of building consents issued for separate dwellings in the period between 2005 and 2014 from the Nelson 
City Council and Tasman District Council. Data sourced from Statistics New Zealand.  
An important indicator of development style is the floor area of the dwellings that are being 
constructed. For this period, the average floor area for new separate dwellings declined across 
both authorities from peaks of 221.9m2 to 200.6m2 for the TDC and 211.3m2 to 188.2m2 for 
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Figure 13: Average floor area of building consents issued for separate dwellings in the Nelson City Council and Tasman 
District Council for the period between 2005 and 2015. Data sourced from Statistics New Zealand.  
The number of building consents issued for attached dwellings was significantly less for this 
period. Furthermore, numbers are also subject to higher variability as large scale retirement of 
lifestyle village developments are developed. An example of this is in the spikes in 2011 (99) 
for the NCC and 2014 (51) for the TDC (Figure 14). The increased number of attached 
dwellings issued with building consent in the Nelson authority boundaries reflects the higher 
proportion of residents who reside within these dwelling types. 
 
Figure 14: Building consents issued for attached dwellings between the period 2005 and 2014 from the Nelson City Council 
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The average floor area for attached dwellings which were issued with building consent for this 
period decreased for the NCC from 162.7m2 to 107.8m2 while the average floor area stayed 
more consistent for the TDC (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15: Average floor area of building consents issued for attached dwellings in the Nelson City Council and Tasman 
District Council for the period between 2005 and 2015. Data sourced from Statistics New Zealand.  
Overall occupancy and consents issued reinforce the dominance of the detached low-density 
low rise development typology within the NUA. More people reside within these, so that is 
what the market is delivering. There is a significant demographic shift occurring as the 
population of the NUA ages. Higher attached dwelling occupancy rates for those aged 65 or 
older necessitates greater supply of higher density typologies to meet this demand. The data 
suggests this may already be occurring as the trend from this period was a move towards 
smaller separate and attached dwellings.  
5.2 Nelson Urban Area Policy Analysis  
Understanding how development is managed in the NUA requires an understanding of the 
policy which is used to guide or inform resource management decisions made under the RMA 
and broader governance decisions under the LGA. This section examines the statutory planning 
documents for the Nelson Urban Area. As two unitary authorities, the Nelson City Council and 
Tasman District Council, govern this area, documents from both authorities will be examined. 
These include the regional policy statements, district plans, long term plans, development 
contributions policy, and other relevant policy to HASHA. The purpose of this section is to 




















Average Floor Area for Attached Dwellings Issued 
with Building Consent 
Tasman District Council Nelson City Council




compare the typological outcomes which are produced under the status quo with what has been 
incentivised under the implementation of HASHA in the NUA. As discussed within Chapter 
3, these regulatory controls accrue as compliance and deadweight costs to development which 
influences outcomes. Standards imposed for Permitted or controlled activities will be assessed 
as these are activities which can be either done as of right or must be granted resource consent 
which limits the transactional costs imposed. This assessment will help to address the second 
and third research objectives.  
This section does not examine all of the relevant policy, instead, it will focus on representative 
examples which illustrate the position of both councils concerning urban development for 
housing. Table 9 below displays the current statutory and non-statutory planning documents 
which regulate urban development for housing in the Nelson Urban Area. The relationships 
between these documents have been explored in Chapter 2. 
Table 9:Planning documents from the Tasman District Council and Nelson City Council analysed 
Planning Documents and Policy 
Nelson City 
Council 
RMA Nelson Resource Management Plan 
LGA 






RMA Tasman Resource Management Plan 
LGA 















5.2.1 Tasman Resource Management Plan   
The main statutory planning document of the Tasman District Council is the Tasman Resource 
Management Plan (TRMP) which became operative in November 2008. A significant plan 
change for urban development within the NUA became operative in December 2018, which is 
aimed at improving the housing choice within Richmond. Consequently, it is essential to 
acknowledge that the development baselines explored in Section 5.3 of this chapter do not 
reflect the policy as it exists today. The issues, objectives and policies relating to urban 
development for housing in this analysis subsequently reflect the change but were not operative 
during the gazettal of the SHA, however, due to the timing of the applying for resource consent 
these may have applied. As the TDC includes several distinct urban areas, issues, objectives, 
and policies are identified for each area, and this section will summarise those which are 
relevant to the NUA, primarily Richmond and Hope.   
The TRMP presents the policy framework for managing the environmental effects of urban 
development. It identifies high-level district-wide issues relating to urban development for 
housing, primarily the loss of productive land from peripheral growth in Richmond (Issues, 
6.2.1 and 6.8.1.1) and the relationship of development to landscape settings (Issue, 6.7.1 and 
6.8.1.6).  The identified issues highlight the conflict that arises between competing demands 
for land from urban population growth. The supporting objectives to these issues strongly 
reflect the desire of the TDC to manage these competing land uses and show a preference for 
urban containment. This is demonstrated either through the explicit use of 'containment' 
(Objective 6.4.2) or through the wording of objectives to include a reference to 'mitigating the 
loss of land' (Objective 6.2.2.1) or more 'efficient use of land' (Objective 6.2.2.2) 
The productive lands of the Waimea Plain are highly valued within the TRMP for the 
horticulture and viticulture activities undertaken there. Urban development is directed away 
from these areas through a policy framework which broadly prioritises intensification, greater 
housing choice, and containment. The containment policies are directed at preserving the 
productivity, characteristics and amenity, which is provided to the district by the rural areas 
(Policy 6.2.3.1 & 3). The efficiency of resource use is also promoted as a benefit of this policy. 
To support containment of housing development, the plan employs policies which support 
deferred zoning to stage development and ensure the activities are not undertaken to harm the 
potential for future development capacity (Policies 6.3.3.1 and 6.3.3.4). Intensification policy 
encourages smaller residential lots sizes and medium density development which promotes a 
high standard of amenity and connectivity (Policies 6.1.3.1, 6.2.3.2 and 6.2.3.2A). Greater 




diversity in housing supply is supported in identifying areas which are less likely to experience 
a reduction in the amenity value (Policy 6.8.3.27A-C). Emphasis is placed upon ensuring that 
intensive development typologies should be compatible in height, bulk and location to 
surrounding development (Policies 6.1.3.1A).  
The TRMP also includes policy which is specific to Richmond. This policy establishes the 
desired areas for urban intensification or expansion (Policy 6.8.3.10-11) and introduces the 
defined development areas for which discrete rules are implemented. The clear focus of these 
policies is to guide the timing and type of development which occurs, promoting intensive 
development in specific areas such as Richmond Central while also reserving land for future 
mixed commercial and industrial uses in Richmond West Policy 6.8.3.8). 
The policy framework provides explicit support for compact density development and medium 
density development to avoid continued growth on the urban periphery. The desire for these 
development styles is not uninhibited, as there is a clear focus on quality urban design and 
development which does not impact upon the amenity through adherence to minimum 
standards within the rule framework. In implementing these minimum standards, the plan 
adopts zone approach which clusters activities based upon their environmental effects. Urban 
development for housing is mostly only supported within the Residential Zone as all other 
zones have policies to prevent excessive new residential development. The policy framework 
for the residential zones supports a push towards more medium density, an intensive, or 
comprehensive housing development for the areas of the Residential Zone in Richmond (Policy 
6.8.3.27B). The Plan definitions of these development types can be found in Table 10 below. 
The policy does not give carte blanche to medium density developments, as it still requires 
development with high amenity and sensitivity to character and adjacent land uses through 
imposing minimum design standards which vary between specified areas of the Residential 
Zone (Policy 6.8.3.27C). The layout of these zones can be found in Figure 16 below.




Table 10: Residential development types and their characteristics from the Tasman Resource Management Plan. These are 
targeted at specific areas within the district. 
Development Type Characteristics Where 
Standard 




Three or more dwellings on a site, 
building coverage of 40%, minimum site 
size 280m2 
Residential – Excluding 
Development Areas 
except for Richmond 
East below Hill Street 
Compact 
One or more dwellings on-site, all 
consents (subdivision and building) 
applied together, no minimum lot size 
Residential, Except 




One or more dwellings on a site, 




The rule framework within the TRMP implements standards which control urban development 
in the Residential Zone through two avenues: density and amenity. The TRMP controls density 
through minimum lot sizes and minimum average lot sizes for subdivision (Table 11). The 
differential rule framework for the discrete areas of the Residential Zone is intended to support 
the desire for appropriate development at the appropriate place as outlined within the policy 
framework. For example, minimum lot sizes are lowest for the RIDA, which supports intensive 
development in these areas. The differential minimum lot sizes subdivisions of less than 1 ha 
for the Residential Zone theoretically supports intensification through subdivision of larger 
sections or infill development within established residential areas. Similarly, the controlled 
standards for average lot sizes for subdivisions of greater than 1 ha seem to try and balance 
development without losing amenity on landscape value through significant increases in 
intensity in new areas of residential activity. 
Amenity within the Residential Zone is maintained using rules which outline the permitted 
minimum standards for outdoor living space, site coverage, height, and setback (Table 12). 
These seek to control the style of development, particularly regarding the outdoor living space 
requirements and differential maximum permitted heights based upon lot sizes. Implementing 
the permitted heights for residential buildings on lots of less than 400m2 of 5m for the 
Residential Zone and 6.5m for the RIDA effectively caps the building to one story given a 
standard floor height of 3.5m. This places a high deadweight cost upon development. To 




maximise the intensification potential of smaller sites, multiple storey dwellings are ideal, 
particularly given the other deadweight costs introduced through rules for building coverage 
(between 30% and 50%) and outdoor living space (60m2). Given these rather stringent 
standards, compact (through the requirement to obtain subdivision consent at the same time), 
comprehensive and intensive developments remain restricted discretionary activities. This 
means that any housing developments which seek to implement a medium or high-density 
residential according to the typological taxonomy require resource consent. These rules enable 
the council to maintain control over urban intensification and multi-level dwellings.  
As the consenting process offered under HASHA is inherently about removing the non-
complying activity status for activities, this must also be considered. The non-complying rule 
framework applies to development types which occur outside of the designated zones or 
development areas outlined in Table 10. For instance, comprehensive development is a non-









Table 11: Controlled minimum subdivision standards for subdivision in the Residential Zone of the Tasman Resource Management Plan. As no subdivision is permitted under the Plan, the 
Controlled standards apply as resource consent must be granted.  
 




Average Allotment Area 
Shape Factor 
(Allotments able to 
contain a circle with 
diameter of 16m) 
Minimum Road or Public 
Reserve Frontage Width 
Residential – 
Standard Density 








Subdivided area <1ha 
350m2 
20% of allotments ≥700m2 
60% of Allotments between 550m2 
and 800m2 









 Richmond West 
Development Area 
350m2 
95% of Allotments 
require 10m 
 






Table 12: Dwelling standards for different activity statuses within the Residential Zone under the Tasman Resource Management Plan. 
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5.2.2 Nelson Resource Management Plan  
The NRMP became operative in September 2004, prior to the growth which the district is 
currently experiencing. Recognising the changing demand for housing and the opportunity for 
improved urban design outcomes, a significant plan change addressing much of the urban 
development related policy and rules was adopted by the NCC in 2015. Consequently, it is 
essential to acknowledge that the development baselines explored in section 5.3 of this chapter 
do not reflect the policy as it exists today. 
The NRMP presents numerous district-wide issues relating to urban development for housing 
which fall into three main categories: urban design outcomes, use of natural and physical 
resources, and competing demands and value conflicts. The TRMP acknowledges that there 
have been examples in the past of poor urban design outcomes from development in terms of 
scale, energy resiliency, connectivity and diversity (Issue RI14A.1). An identified cause of this 
has been the treatment of developments as individual activities with little consideration to 
strategic planning and district-wide effects. The competition for resources arises between land 
demands from different activities (Issue RI16). As a geographically constrained city, 
competition for flat land between residential, rural, and industrial is prominent at the rural-
urban fringe and has led to encroachment. This links to Issue RI11.ii, which is concerned with 
the efficient use of natural and physical resources. It acknowledges that demand for land for 
housing on the urban periphery conflicts with other values such as natural character and 
landscape, while equally, densification can conflict with established amenity values. 
The district-wide objectives and policies to address these issues are broad in scope and have 
broadly been categorised into urban design, urban development, and urban expansion. The 
urban design objectives outlined in the NRMP establish a vision for a development which 
reflects the distinct local environment. As an area with a highly valued environment, the 
objectives within the Plan emphasise connectivity to it and protection from inappropriate 
development (Objectives DO13A.1-6). The policy framework to support this highlights the 
strong desire for connectivity with development occurring in locations which are accessible via 
all transport networks (Policy DO13A.2.1), which can support a range of development 
typologies (Policy DO13A.4.1), and is strategic to minimise conflict and the cumulative 
adverse effects of development (Policies DO13A.5.1 and DO13A.6.2). 
The urban design policy is integrated with the urban development objectives and policy to 
reinforce the focus on the development, which facilitates connections to different natural values 




(Objectives DO14.1 and DO14.2). Much of the policy relating to urban development relates to 
the efficient use of resources and not comprising future uses of land (Objective DO14.3, 
Policies DO14.1.2 and DO14.2.1). While the policy framework enables the exploration of 
different densities and typologies, it adopts this while having regard to the relationship of these 
developments with the environment to ensure that amenity values are not impacted upon 
(Policy DO14.2.1). This policy is supported by the rules and requirements for comprehensive 
housing. The timely delivery of services and facilities is also highlighted as an essential 
component of ensuring orderly development which also does not compromise future uses. 
To support the recognition of competing land uses from geographic constraints, the TRMP 
advocates for containment of urban development through infill development which promotes 
efficiencies of development (Objective DO15.1 and Policy 15.1.1). However, it is not 
unsupportive of urban expansion if the potential adverse impacts and avoided, remedied or 
mitigated (Policy DO15.1.2). It does qualify this with reference to the maintenance of the 
greenbelt which exists between the Stoke and Richmond (Policy DO15.1.3). 
The NRMP employs zones as the method of the locational management of resources 
throughout the district. These zones give effect to the district-wide policy framework through 
the rules which manage activities within them. The zones which are relevant to this research 
are Residential and Inner City (Refer to Figure 17 below for the zone map). 
Low rise dwellings characterise the residential zone on individual lots with a variety of 
architectural style reflecting the different settlement and development periods (Nelson City 
Council, 2004). The overarching objectives of the Residential zone support the maintenance of 
the amenity and character of this area (Objectives RE1 and RE2). It does, however, recognise 
the need to provide diversity in residential styles through different densities and development 
typologies (Policy RE1.1, 1.2 and 1.2.A). These policies prioritise higher density developments 
in locations which can support them without detracting from the amenity of the area. 
Importantly, the policy provides support for developments which breach minimum standards 
for density, building form, and site development, provided it is complementary to what other 
policy is trying to achieve (Policy RE1.2 and 1.2A). The protection of amenity is given 
prominence in the rules which support these policies.  
The Inner City Zone contains the commercial centre of Nelson and is split into two discrete 
areas: City Centre and City Fringe. The City Centre is bound by the ring road formed by 
Collingwood, Halifax, and Rutherford Streets, and Selwyn Place. It is relatively compact, 




absent of any ribbon development which is common in other cities. The City Fringe surrounds 
the City Centre and is the transition zone between residential zones. While primarily intended 
to be non-residential, residential activities are supported (Objective IC4). The policy again 
supports the maintenance of residential amenity by establishing a broad bottom line to provide 
a reasonable level of amenity while recognising that, by nature, this level will not be as high as 





Figure 17: Nelson Resource Management Plan zone map. Data sourced from Nelson City Council. 




The rule framework for both zones within the NRMP provides standards which can be again 
categorised into either density or amenity standards, with a more comprehensive set of 
standards for the residential zones. Like the Tasman District Plan, the Nelson City Plan 
provides for comprehensive housing development (three of more residential units on a 
contiguous area within resource and subdivision consents submitted together) within the 
Residential – Higher Density Area, however, this is a restricted discretionary activity unless 
the permitted standards for dwellings are met which are very inhibiting for this style of 
development. This is to maintain a high standard of amenity in these developments as the Plan 
acknowledges that the effects of these developments are not always contained within the site 
boundaries. Given this, standards are not easily applied to these developments, so there are no 
minimum standards set explicitly within the Plan. 
The density provisions of minimum allotment areas and dwellings for the residential zone are 
split between designated high, standard and low-density areas Table 13. Similarly, the site 
coverage provisions are also differential, which allows for control over developments which 
may significantly alter the residential character of specific areas.  These mapped are used to 
support the policy framework for a desire to place development in appropriate locations to 
avoid cumulative adverse effects on the environment and amenity values. While the policies 
within the NRMP support urban containment, subdivision and residential activities in the Rural 
– Small Holdings Higher Density are controlled activities. These areas are primarily on the 
floors of the valleys surrounding Nelson. 
The amenity standards for Residential Zones of the NRMP relate to dwellings per site, outdoor 
living spaces, daylight controls and height (Table 14). The Plan intends to maintain standard 
low-density low-rise residential density through the maximum one dwelling per site and 
outdoor living spaces. The daylights controls and the height rules control multi-storey 
development in the Residential area. By using daylight as the variable for boundary height, this 
effectively limits permitted multi-storey development to larger sections. This limit places a 
regulatory cap on the implementation of medium and high-density development within the 
residential zones of Nelson. Non-complying activity status for residential activities is only 
applied when they occur within the designated overlay areas for airport and port noise overlays,  
Development for residential activities within the Inner City Zone is managed through a more 
permissive rule framework given the receiving environment with increased building coverage 
(100%) and height (15m). The use of the City Centre and City Fringe partition of the Inner City 




zone allows for a soft transition from high-density medium-rise housing typologies which this 
rule framework permits in this zone to the low-density low rise typologies which are permitted 
in the Residential Zone. The rule requirements for outdoor living spaces or balconies do, 




Table 13: Controlled minimum subdivision standards for subdivision in the Residential Zone of the Tasman Resource Management Plan. As no subdivision is permitted under the Plan, the 






Zone Minimum Allotment Area Average Allotment Area 
Shape Factor 
Allotments capable of containing 
a 15m by 18m rectangle 
Residential – Lower Density 
600m2 
850m2 for Stoke 
1000m2 for Stoke Yes 
Residential- Higher Density 300m2  Yes 
Residential 400m2  Yes 
Rural – Small Holdings 
Higher Density 
5000m2 1ha  
 
 
Table 14: Permitted dwelling standards for residential development under the Nelson Resource Management Plan. 

















600m2 30% 1 
Site area <350m2 
Dependent on 
bedrooms: 
1 bed – 35m2 
2 bed - 50m2 
3 bed - 75m2 
7.5m 
Daylight Over 







placed at an 












300m2 40% 1 7.5m 1.5m 
Residential 400m2 40% 1 7.5m 1.5m 
Inner City  100%  
Outdoor living 




3 or more 40m2 
OR 
balcony of 12m2 
15m  




5.2.2 Long Term Plans 
Long Term Plans under the LGA include desired community outcomes and outline the growth 
and infrastructure issues within their administrative areas. This includes an Infrastructure 
Strategy, which can outline specific issues and key capital expenditure over the duration of the 
plan to address those issues, and the Development and Financial Contributions Policy, which 
outline the infrastructure servicing charges which council imposes. As the availability of 
infrastructure for development is a primary concern of HASHA, the contents of these plans 
need to be explored to identify how they relate to the urban development for housing that has 
occurred. 
5.2.2.1 Development and Financial Contributions Policies 
An essential consideration for applications for SHA and the consenting process under HASHA 
is the supply of adequate infrastructure to service the development. As the cost of infrastructure 
is significant for local authorities, development and financial contributions policies allow for 
the sharing of costs for servicing infrastructure. These policies arise under both the RMA, 
through s108(2) as a condition for subdivision consents, and under the LGA s106 as a policy 
for recovering a fair and equitable proportion of the capital expenditure for infrastructure to 
service development which obtain gain from those services. Essentially allocating costs to the 
community or groups which benefit most from those services – internalising costs which would 
otherwise be footed by ratepayers within those districts. These present opportunities to 
implement incentive-based approaches to policy to induce outcomes which may otherwise not 
arise. Development and financial contributions are revised every three years at the same time 
as the long-term plans which forecast expected growth to ensure that contributions are set at a 
level which will be sufficient to fund growth over the ten years of that plan. 
Typically, contributions are determined by equivalent household units of demand (HUD) for 
infrastructure services such as stormwater, wastewater, water, and transport. For a subdivision, 
HUD quantities are the number of new allotments created minus land vested to the Council or 
the Crown. For the 2018-2028 LTP's for the TDC and NCC, development contributions per 
HUD are in Table 15. These are payable at the time of either resource or building consent being 
granted or when applying for subdivision certificate under s224 of the RMA. 
 




Table 15: Development and financial contributions required for servicing development in the Tasman District Council and 
the Nelson City Councils in 2018 policy. Data sourced from Tasman District Council and Nelson City Council.  
Infrastructure Service Tasman 2018-2028 Nelson 2018-2028 
Water Supply $8907 $2050 
Wastewater $10442 $5000 
Stormwater $6374 $3230 
Transport $1290 $1370 
Community Infrastructure - $280 
Reserves - $1160 + 40m2 per HUD 
Total $27013 $13090 
 
However, special assessments and remissions can be made for certain developments which can 
offer significant discounts for developments that fulfil specific criteria and support broader 
strategic objectives of Council. These discounts are intended to act as incentives for 
development which, for example, in Nelson, maximises infrastructure use in already developed 
city centre areas (NCC, 2018). These were introduced in the NCC LTP 2015-2025 to include 
full development contribution remissions for the development of addition residential and/or 
residential with commercial units in the City Centre Zone of the Inner City Zone and for the 
development of additional residential units in the City Fringe Zone of the Inner City Zone 
within the NRMP (Nelson City Council, 2015). These remissions were limited to the first 30 
additional HUDs per financial year for the duration of the policy. This policy was rolled over 
to the 2018 version of that policy under the same conditions with additional remissions being 
offered of 25% of the reserve contribution for residential brownfield intensification. 
A similar policy was adopted in the TDC Development and Financial Contributions Policy 
2018-2028 with discounts offered under the special assessments for small homes. This was 
introduced in conjunction with Plan Change 66 to support housing choice within Richmond. 
Discounts are offered of 25% per HUD for dwellings which fulfil the criteria for small 
dwellings of gross floor area <110m2 and ≤3 Bedrooms and 50% per HUD for dwellings which 
fulfil the criteria for minor dwellings of gross floor area <65m2 and one bedroom. While this 
policy was not operative for the consent applications for the SHA's, due to the timing of when 
the development contributions are payable, they may still be applicable. 




A further avenue for flexibility is in the developer agreements under s207A-207F of the LGA 
which allow for Council and developers to enter into an arrangement for the provision of 
particular infrastructure. Both the TDC and NCC offer these as required under the LGA. These 
are typically used for when development occurs ahead of the anticipated rate within the LTP 
and allow for flexible funding agreements for servicing infrastructure (Nelson City Council, 
2018). This is particularly relevant for the consideration of the availability of adequate 
infrastructure to service development which is required under HASHA. 
5.2.3 Tasman District Council Lead Policy 
In considering applications for SHA, the TDC also adopted a lead policy to guide the Council's 
recommendations for SHA to the government. As this influenced the SHA which were 
recommended and thus the resulting development, this needs to be considered. Given that the 
overall goal of the Tasman Housing Accord is to improve housing supply and affordability, the 
lead policy seeks to contribute to that by recommending SHA, which will contribute to this. 
While the housing accord does not provide an explicit mandate for affordable housing, the lead 
policy does. The criteria for recommendations include the following considerations: 
1. Location – the SHA should generally be consistent with patterns of urban growth within 
the TRMP and LTP. The land selected should be residential or otherwise be a 
sustainable loss for other purposes. 
2. Adequate infrastructure should exist to service the development. If it does not, then that 
infrastructure should be privately provided and funded and developers will need to enter 
agreements for this. 
3. Demand – there is demand for the qualifying developments which the SHA will deliver.  
4. Demand for residential development should support housing choice.  
5. The development needs to be predominantly residential.  
6. The SHA is financially and commercially viable  
7. Building height will be determined in the declaration for the SHA and will be guided 
by the characteristics of the adjacent land and the TRMP 
8. Consultation may be required, and the council may take into account community views. 
9. Developments should demonstrate a proactive approach to housing affordability by 
limiting lot size, floor space or the number of dwellings, limiting developer covenants 
that add to the cost of building; gifting serviced land or making contributions to 
affordable housing providers. 




The lead policy provided a clear mandate to the council to consider housing and development 
typology diversity in their decisions to recommend SHA. This policy provides a strong 
framework for pushing higher density developments to occur within the TDC portion of the 
NUA. 
5.3 Special Housing Areas 
The third research objective seeks to identify the resultant urban development for housing 
typologies which have originated under the implementation of HASHA. A significant number 
of SHA which have been gazetted in the NUA are yet to receive resource consent, limiting 
their usefulness to this research as potential development are unlikely to reflect consented 
development. Thus, only those SHA which have received resource consent for development 
under the alternative consenting pathway of HASHA will be considered for this research. Table 
16 lists the SHA, which will be examined in this research and the required dwelling yields 
under the gazettal notice. The numbers correspond to the SHA location map displayed in Figure 
18.  




Table 16: Special housing areas within the Nelson Urban Area which have been granted resource consent for housing 
development under the alternative consenting process. 
Number Special Housing Area Unitary Authority Zone 
1 The Fields 
Tasman District Council 
Deferred Mixed 




3 The Meadows 
4 323 Hill Street Rural Residential 
5 Barcelona Lofts 
Nelson City Council 
Suburban Commercial 
6 Betts Carpark Inner City Fringe 
7 Bishopdale Pottery Residential 
8 Ocean Lodge Suburban Commercial 
9 Orchard Street Residential 
10 Three Ridges Residential 
11 Toi Toi Street Residential 
12 Farleigh Rural 
13 81-83 Haven Road Inner City Fringe 
14 371 Wakefield Quay Residential 




Figure 18: Map of the special housing areas which have been consenting in the Nelson Urban Area. Source: Authors Research (2019).




5.4 Summary  
The NUA is going to experience a profound demographic change in the long term through an 
aging population and strong in-migration from retirees. Geographic constraints and the 
economic value of the land mean that urban containment and intensification policies are 
attractive to manage the urban development for housing that will occur. The demand for large, 
detached dwelling typologies is not conducive to achieving containment. Furthermore, the rule 
framework for both the NCC and TDC does not currently provide for this, however, as the 
permitted standards (e.g., height, density, and bulk) support the status quo of low-density low 
rise urban form. Provisions for more compact and intensive development have been included 
within plan changes; however these all require resource consent through restricted 
discretionary or discretionary activity status. The implications of this will be explored further 
within Chapter 7 when comparing housing development under HASHA to what has occurred 
under the existing regulatory framework in the NUA. The analysis of the research area and 
policy framework contribute to addressing the research aim by establishing the conditions 
under which the market currently operates to deliver housing. This is useful for understanding 
how the incentives offered under HASHA affect urban development for housing and 
subsequently, the causal pathways for this influence. This will be addressed within the 
following chapters which present the results of the research related to how the implementation 
of HASHA has affected the delivery and typologies of housing development in the NUA 




6 Results: Implementation of  HASHA  
Addressing the first research objective requires an evaluation of the implementation of HASHA 
in the NUA. This chapter will present the qualitative results that relate to this research objective 
from participant interviews. The contents of this chapter have been derived from a thematic 
analysis of the participants’ interview transcripts. A significant feature of this implementation 
is the pervasiveness of politics and power relationships. The first section will explore how this 
has occurred while the second will explore the implications of this for the implementation of 
HASHA. As two councils compose the NUA, this chapter identifies differences and similarities 
in implementation and the overall effect of these. 
6.1 Politics in Implementation 
The introduction of legislation is inherently political, from which party introduces it to the 
policy goals which are intended to be supported by it. This influence is twofold when 
considering the role of devolved governance in both recommending and implementing SHA 
under HASHA. There was a shared feeling of amongst planners that councils bore the burden 
of achieving the political goals of the central government. KI5 summarised this position, saying 
that: 
"there was probably a certain feeling that council had its arm twisted behind its back 
by the government and that you know, this was the new thing and that please go along 
with it etc.… It was just pure politics at that level" [KI5] 
Another participant noted that the change in government and the quick repeal of sections of 
HASHA was a definite signal that the implementation of it was highly political [KI2]. Many 
participants felt that the decision-making structure of declaring SHA was an avenue for direct 
political influence in local government and planning processes, with KI1 noting that “here 
[HASHA] is the opportunity for that to influence that process for whatever the colour of the 
government”. The direct involvement of the government in planning outside of the RMA even 
incongruous with devolved decision making and the planning hierarchy. KI2 expanded upon 
this, stating that: 
“For devolved governance just to do something, it’s an unusual step that the council 
makes a recommendation and that the government still has a right to veto”. [KI2] 




Participants identified that politics is reflected in the very focus of HASHA in delivering 
housing. The participants were not directly asked what they felt the goal of HASHA was, 
however several offered that it was primarily a numbers game when it came to housing. Many 
noted that the focus on numbers helps the appearances of addressing the issue, having the 
numbers to present back from HASHA aides in the tangibility of the policy and being seen to 
do something about a problem. KI1 referred to the focus as a missed opportunity for urban 
design, noting that “a lot of the initiatives to date have all been about housing numbers rather 
than about the actual design and quality of design”. The focus on numbers was driven by 
Treasury and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, generating tension 
between the Ministry for the Environment and Councils as: 
"There wasn't that focus on planning and planning outcomes. It was very much the 
numbers in the bottom line, and there was quite a tension there" [KI2]. 
6.2 Features of Implementation  
The participants of the research offered their professional insights and experiences with the 
implementation of HASHA in the NUA. From these, three thematic areas of the 
implementation of HASHA can be identified: the contents and signing of the housing accords, 
the assessment and granting of SHA, and the assessment of resource consents under the 
alternative consenting pathway offered under HASHA.  
6.2.1 Affordability and Housing Accords  
Both the NCC and TDC entered into housing accords with the government. A crucial feature 
of these accords is that neither included affordability criteria of, for example, 10 to 20% of 
housing for qualifying developments. Multiple participants identified this as a critical feature 
of the implementation and the outcomes of HASHA for the NUA. KI4 noted that:  
“Whereas some of the housing accords do you have a requirement for affordability… 
So you are increasing housing supply, but there is no requirement in there for there to 
be affordable housing." [KI4] 
The exclusion of affordability criteria is an important consideration, as while the accords both 
mention improving affordability, the perception was that the implied approach by both councils 
was that increasing housing supply or capacity should have a flow-on effect to district-wide 
affordability. 




There were contrasting opinions on this exclusion. Participants based their positions upon the 
effectiveness of the criteria and the assumptions underlying the exclusion. KI5 stated that they 
expected both councils were: 
"probably a bit sceptical about them. How do you implement them? How do you 
monitor them? How long for? Does discounting a certain number of units have the 
perverse effect on the other units as a premium to recoup the affordability premium?" 
[KI5].  
In contrast, KI2 noted that this resulted in developers delivering big, expensive homes because: 
"There is a tenuous argument that if they were allowed to build these quality houses, 
then the people that were going to buy these were not going to buy the cheaper houses. 
Therefore, the cheaper houses would be available for first homeowners.” [KI2] 
The general feeling amongst participants was, however, that HASHA was never viewed as a 
policy vehicle which was ever going to have a meaningful impact on house prices for the NUA. 
6.2.2 Assessment of SHA 
The process of establishment of SHA within the NUA was experienced differently between the 
NCC and TDC. While the NCC received several SHA applications from the start, the TDC 
received an influx in 2017. Some participants identified the limited criteria for evaluating SHA 
as an important feature of the implementation. The three criteria ultimately considered are the 
supply of adequate infrastructure, evidence of demand to create a qualifying development in 
that area, evidence of demand for residential housing in that area. In response, both the NCC 
and TDC introduced additional criteria for evaluating applications for SHA:  
“the criteria within the housing accord and special housing areas act is quite limited. 
So we quickly drafted up a policy to go alongside council so that they could use that to 
guide their thinking and decision-making.” [KI1].  
Both councils included criteria for evaluation against the current policy framework of their 
resource management plans. Participants at both councils felt that this was an essential criterion 
because of what obtaining the SHA designation meant for the processing of consents. 
Once granted, the SHA designation allowed limited recourse to the policies and objectives of 
the plans. KI1noted that given these additional criteria at council level, it was surprising that 
an SHA did not get approved at central government:  




"We were actually the first authority in the country to have one declined, and it was for 
three units in Richmond so it was very small, so it was turned down and we had a letter 
that basically said the government didn't feel that three units was going to make 
significant change to our housing supply so it wasn't the right vehicle to use a special 
housing area… and there was a bit of an emphasis put on in that letter on affordable 
housing and kind of hinting that any future special housing areas if they had more of 
affordable housing component" [KI1]. 
Participants questioned this decision, as invariably, previous and concurrent SHA either were 
not evaluated against or delivering on these criteria. One participant noted that the effect of this 
was:  
"some of these developers did sort of market their proposals to the council as providing 
affordable housing, i.e. smaller lot and smaller houses than the norm but I think that 
was really just to get support for their proposals really" [KI2].  
Additionally, participants felt that infrastructure assessments allowed significant discretion that 
arose from the wording exists or is likely to exist. Multiple participants noted that the effect of 
this was that it allowed developers to come through and offer alternative infrastructure 
arrangements. There were differing opinions on this, depending on their role in the public or 
private space. No participant explicitly stated that it was a negative effect of the process; rather, 
it just allowed greater flexibility. For instance, KI2 gave the following example where:  
“a developer came in the door, and said I'll give you this, this and this and we want a 
SHA… So some of these developers have said I know you can't afford a reservoir but 
we will pay for half of it and we will build it now, and you can have it. So that introduces 
a political aspect" [KI5] 
 Other participants noted that funding agreements also allowed for concessions between 
developers and councils to be made regarding development details and planning as the 
developer would have otherwise provided servicing infrastructure with less thought to long 
term consequences. KI6 was confident that this flexibility enabled development as "councils 
were just not prepared with infrastructure for these levels of development experienced” [KI6]  
6.2.3 Assessment of Consents 
The most critical element of the HASHA and subsequently SHA, is in the alternative 
consenting pathway offered under Part 2 of the Act. There was a unanimous response from 




participants that this was the most important component of the legislation. All planner 
participants acknowledged the impact of having the primary purpose of HASHA as the 
paramount consideration for this alternative process under section 34 was significant. KI4 
attributed this to the weighting of effects under HASHA:  
“So there are changes in that when you're considering the effects of the development, 
that is essentially the same, the difference is essentially the weighting system at the end 
in terms of the priorities of HASHA. So there are a lot of similarities with the RMA but 
there are some obviously very distinct differences.” [KI4] 
One participant acknowledged that the weighting of effects is where there is considerable room 
for discretion. This discretion arises as the Act is somewhat unclear on the relative 
consideration of other effects: 
“So the principle purposes is the provision of housing. Then your normal 
considerations under the RMA slot under that. So they are still there but lower in the 
hierarchy. What’s interesting or what’s contested here is, to what extent do those 
secondary and tertiary matters, how are they considered against that first point? If 
there is a really significant effect of a proposal, does that get trumped by the fact that 
the proposal is providing housing?" [KI5].  
While there have been no developments quite as contentious, a number of participants pointed 
to the Court of Appeal decision on the Shelley Bay development in Wellington which found 
fault in the Wellington City Councils application of s 34 of the Act in that it erroneously used 
the purpose of the Act to neutralise all other considerations ( Enterprise Miramar Peninsula 
Incorporated v Wellington City Council [2018] NZCA 541). Given the zoning approach to 
managing the effects produced by activities which are prevalent within district plans, most 
participants felt that this was a direct method of circumventing this method of managing 
activities to support the policy framework. To be specific: 
“if the zoning is not conducive to the development, HASHA is a way that you can get 
around those zones to get housing in a place that under the RMA you may not get 
housing there” [KI4]. 
 





The implementation of HASHA within the NUA can be typified as a top-down political 
process. The political goals of the government have been imprinted in all areas of 
implementation, leaving little scope for councils of the NUA to influence the process once the 
housing accords were signed. IN addressing the first research objective, the assessment of 
implementation suggests the approach and focus on numbers at least temporarily altered how 
urban development for housing has been managed. Through the role of the central government 
in approving SHA, once this designation was granted then development which met the political 
goals of the government was virtually assured of consent being granted. Consequently, the 
structure of decision-making was changed as local government become administrators of the 
process rather than occupying their usual regulatory role under the RMA. The implications of 
this within the broader urban development for housing outcomes observed in the NUA will be 
discussed with specific reference to the research aims and objectives in Chapter 8.   
 




7 Results: Incentives and Housing 
Development  
This chapter will present the results of the second and third research objectives which seek to 
investigate the effects of HASHA through the evaluation of incentives and the urban 
development for housing outcomes in the NUA. These objectives will be explored and 
discussed together as they are interlinked objectives. This chapter will present the results of the 
key informant interviews in Section 7.1, and the GIS analysis of development between 2005-
2014, and the content analysis of the resource consent applications in Section 7.3. 
7.1 Incentives for Housing Development   
Implicit within the policy goal of increasing housing supply of HASHA, is an incentivisation 
process. Participants were not asked directly about the process of incentivising development; 
instead, they were asked what they thought the significant effects of HASHA and SHA were 
for the production of housing. The responses can be broken into three categories: costs, risk, 
and feasibility. 
7.1.1 Reducing Development Costs  
Of the factors affecting outcomes, all participants had some regard to the lower costs involved 
in the consenting phase of HASHA, much of which comes down to the lack of public 
notification. KI7 summarised this as: “From a developers perspective, no public involvement 
has huge benefits from timelines and overheads”. Participants acknowledged that the effect of 
no public notification was twofold: reduction in processing/regulatory costs, and the reduced 
timeframes and possibility of delays. 
Regarding the first effect, some participants from the public sector pointed out that the scale 
was an important factor. The amount of documentation required to support the consent 
applications was considerable. The impact of this is that the reduction in regulatory costs may 
not be as significant as expected. KI4 noted that: 
“Whether that’s actually happened from the developers perspective will be interesting. 
Because I mean some of these HASHA consents, have been… Because of the sheer scale 
of them and the amount of information they have been extremely costly to process to” 
[KI4] 




 This perspective was mirrored in perspectives of two private sector participants, whom both 
found that the process was much longer than expected but appreciated the significant reduction 
in timeline compared to a normal RMA consenting process. The reduction in the timeline was 
noted in particular for developments which occurred out of zone: 
"A number of the SHAs we have handled are out of zone, such as Rural Zone, albeit on 
the edge of the developed urban areas.  Hence, the RMA processes would have been 
notified and strongly opposed in many cases." [KI7]. 
The second effect was also readily apparent in the responses of the participants. KI6 from the 
private sector noted how significant the cost savings from a more streamlined process could be 
as even small delays induce additional costs. They gave the example of year on year increases 
in construction costs and the fact that contractors need to be locked in up to a year in advance.  
7.1.2 Reducing Development Risk 
All participants identified a reduction in risk as the key element that was offered under the 
alternative consenting pathway of HASHA. The primary regard under this is to the delivery of 
housing. Under this primary objective, the usual considerations of an RMA resource consent 
process apply, but by design, are weighted far lower by decision-makers. The effect of this 
being, that developers have much more surety in the outcome of a resource consent application, 
reducing their exposure to uncertainty and consequently, risk [KI4]. The implications of having 
the delivery of housing as the primary criteria for evaluating resource consent applications were 
a significant focus within all interviews. There were contrasting views on the benefits of this, 
with both sides of the acknowledging this: 
“what was probably the most beneficial aspect, although some might question that. It 
enabled a number of sites to be unlocked which might have had planning constraints 
on them that might have struggled to be consented under the normal regime. HASHA 
allowed us to unlock them.” [KI5].  
The alternative consenting pathway was labelled a rezoning mechanism KI3, one that is mostly 
free from the potential for ongoing litigation, because virtually the majority of the land within 
the SHA was suitable for housing. The effect of this was discussed by KI7, who acknowledged 
that the crux of it is that out of zone developments are not tested against the current policy 
framework. Both gave the example of the SHA within Richmond West of the Meadows. 




Multiple participants discussed the impact of the reduction in risk. Two examples were given 
for different development typologies. The first is in the greenfield development occurring in 
Richmond West. Through not being tested against the current policy frameworks of the NRMP 
and TRMP, HASHA has enabled rural zoned land and deferred zoned land to be used for 
intensive residential development; as noted by KI4: 
"In Richmond West particularly getting residential subdivision in this rural zones and 
mixed business lines. So in both of those zones, you would not anticipate intense 
residential development. So obviously, the objectives and policies don't fit that nicely 
with the residential development… but when you don't meet those the weighting at the 
end is to deliver housing. So that sort of a overrides a lot of those zone implications" 
[KI4]  
The second example given was the Betts Carpark development in Nelson. Both KI3 and KI7 
suggested that typically, the permitted standards for height, daylight over and around, car 
parking and outdoor living requirements (Refer to Table 14) are very restrictive for inner-city 
development such as Betts. Several participants acknowledged that through having the primary 
regard to the delivery of housing under the alternative consenting process, the risk of having 
these minimum standards impacting the likelihood of success was significantly lower. KI3 
viewed this as an NUA wide phenomenon: 
“So I think a lot of people saw an opportunity to do infill housing and apartment 
buildings within the urban area on land they might of bought or had already, thinking 
that it would be an easier way to get an apartment building through, like apartments 
and terraces.” [KI3] 
7.1.3 Improvements to Development Feasibility  
Participants identified the reduction in risk as a major component of improving the feasibility 
of projects – particularly those involving higher density development. The majority of 
participants acknowledged that the rule framework impedes intensification and higher density 
development through design requirements such as height and daylight admission. KI3 and KI7 
noted the age of both district plans as a significant factor in this. The initial rule framework 
was not made with intensification in mind: 
“I've heard from other planners and developer agents who have said our clients want 
to develop two-bedroom duplexes, townhouses and apartments but have just told them 
to wait for the new plan they are running into trouble with – minimum car parking 




requirements and outdoor living court requirements. They are really high, particularly 
in the city centre. Our rules are more or less geared to stand-alone developments and 
car transport even on the city fringe” [KI3].  
Council planners also acknowledged that the current district plan had a direct effect on the 
feasibility of intensification: “so we are just starting to see a few more applications come 
through but were sort of told the economics don't stack up for doing two-storey development. 
In terms of feasibility, it just doesn't stack up… So we know that we need to do quite a bit more 
to make it more attractive for developers" [KI1].  
The implementation of HASHA within NUA impacted upon the feasibility through directly 
affecting the margins required for developers, particularly for inner-city or brownfield sites. 
KI3 directly related this to the land value as this is the crucial determinant in profit margins, 
as: 
“high land values can make profit margins nil or not worth the risk of investment unless 
you can manipulate the other variables such as the development type, underlying rules 
or the initial purchase price of the land.” [KI3].  
The implementation of HASHA enabled those variables to be manipulated, with KI5 
suggesting that HASHA “allows you to push the boat out a bit further than what you would 
under the normal regime.” [KI5]. This perspective was supported by KI7, who phrased it as 
"not having limits in the plan applied helps enable developers to design and deliver feasible 
products". It is essential to acknowledge that they the 'feasible' products are still subject to an 
urban design panel for approval before consent is granted.  
The introduction of HASHA also impacted the feasibility of greenfield sites. KI7 was of the 
opinion that while it impacted brownfield, it was greenfield development which experienced 
the most significant increase in feasibility, primarily through larger sites and much lower land 
value per square metre. They used the example of Richmond West, where the land which was 
owned was deferred zone for business or industrial, stating that under the normal RMA regime, 
the inherent risk with the consenting process and requirements for it would have affected the 
profit margins to the point that it was unfeasible. KI3 summarised this effect as "I mean you 
need consent to get development off the ground, but the rules kind of exist to create little 
bubbles of exception which allows that land to sit there empty until something happens to allow 
it – that was HASHA.". 




7.2 Impacts on Market Delivery, Speculation, and Demand   
Multiple participants raised the topic of market delivery of higher density typologies. As there 
were no criteria included for products delivered under HASHA, many felt that the market 
would deliver the housing, which would present the best return on their investment. However, 
as has been explored in the previous section, HASHA did have an impact on the market process. 
Subsequently, participants identified two important consequences. The first relates to the 
speculative element of development, while the second relates to market demand. 
KI7, from their experience in the private sector, strongly felt that the surety of outcomes offered 
through the HASHA alternative consenting process was an essential component in some 
developers delivering alternative products to the market. This is directly related to the 
dimensions of risk and feasibility, which were explored in sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 above. 
Several participants acknowledged that higher density developments are inherently more 
expensive, as opposed to “house and land packages where the houses come out of a nozzle 
basically prebuilt for standard sections” [KI2]. KI7 suggested that very high up-front costs with 
no guarantee of consent being granted have been prohibitive conditions in the past. KI3 
mentioned that this was further reinforced through “major issues with bank lending if it doesn’t 
fit the Weet-Bix style development model”. Weet-Bix being a standard residential subdivision. 
However under HASHA, these conditions can be mitigated as “the surety of outcomes is 
important, knowing that there will be a return on money spent enables development which 
would be a speculative otherwise” [KI7].  
While there was a near-unanimous view amongst participants that HASHA predominantly 
allowed the typical residential subdivision to occur, most did point to the fact that it has enabled 
intensive development typologies which, especially for the case of Richmond, have not been 
seen before. The introduction of higher density development paradigms has been challenging 
in the past within the NUA; KI3 noted that  
“I don’t think that there is a lot of experience in developing those types of products here. And 
use what the real estate people also say, it is a pretty shallow market. They don’t perceive that 
there are very many people in the market for those, so soon as you get one or two developments 
like that… they don’t have a lot of depth” [KI3]. 
This opinion was shared by many participants in the research area, with KI2 supporting this by 
acknowledged that while people are interested or aware of the concept this is not mirrored in 
their preferences: 




 “It’s interesting because when you put it in that context, and ask people where should we grow 
how should we grow and they say don’t go on the productive lands, go here in the city, build 
up. But we had a separate survey which asked where would you like to live and the majority 
said on a lifestyle block.” [KI2].  
Participants from the private sector acknowledged these challenges, referring to slow market 
reception previously from higher-density developments. However, multiple participants 
pointed to the importance of having tangible examples of higher density developments to 
change perceptions related to that lifestyle. KI6, from their experience with the Richmond West 
developments, noted that: 
 “Townhouses experienced slow uptake, it’s a development paradigm that this region hasn’t 
seen a lot of. Having some high quality examples is important for future sales as the tangibility 
of the product is important - people aren’t sure what to expect”.  
Both KI7 and KI3 felt that the Betts Carpark was an enormously important development for 
pushing inner city living in the research area, particularly for challenging perceptions through 
demonstrating the benefits to both the occupants and the neighbourhood:  
“Changing the perception is always about the small wall to wall life, where’s my swing in the 
backyard? and I’ll have to walk upstairs... If a developer provided a good example of 
intensification so we can get the whole load of social, environmental and low travel benefits 
we would see a massive change in the market perception of those products” [KI3] 
The relative affordability of examples of higher density dwellings consented through HASHA 
was identified as a factor which may impact on perceptions. All public sector participants 
shared this opinion. KI1 did speculate that this was related to the present availability of those 
dwelling types: 
“if we get more intensification happening that it might bring the price down a little bit when 
there's more to choose from, I think at the moment there is so little of that product around that 
they can just command the really high price” [KI1] 
7.3 Urban Development for Housing Typologies  
This section will address the third research objective in two parts. The first part will contain 
the results of the qualitative research regarding participant perceptions of the urban 
development for housing outcomes from the implementation of HASHA. Following this are 




the results of the content analysis of resource consents submitted under HASHA. This analysis 
will demonstrate overall patterns of development under HASHA and comparisons will be made 
to the measures of obtained from the GIS analysis. It is important to acknowledge that while 
the examples discussed below have obtained resource consent, most developments are yet to 
be brought to market.  
Participants were all asked what they thought was the type of urban development for housing 
which had resulted from the implementation of HASHA. The overwhelming response was that 
the majority of dwellings and lots created under this process were for a typical residential 
subdivision of large detached houses on medium-sized lots. Participants felt that HASHA did 
what it was intended to do. Increasing the availability of land “accelerated the timeframes” for 
the delivery of what the market would have delivered anyway [KI5]. Public sector participants 
did acknowledge that effort had gone into the diversity in offerings, noting: 
“we have lot sizes and some of those are relatively small – there are some 300 m² ones mixed 
with 400 m² and 500 m² lots. So there was a definite effort certainly by both these developers 
to try and provide some affordable sections” [KI1].  
Speaking on their own experiences, KI6 felt that through allowing large-scale, comprehensive 
development to occur, HASHA had enabled greater diversity in the products on offer, from 
typical dwelling sizes, two-bedroom villas, down to duplexes and townhouses. KI6 stated that 
HSAHA enabled economies of cost and scale which made previously unfeasible projects 
feasible.  One participant, [KI2], had a very contrasting opinion. They felt that the attempts to 
densify development in greenfield was in response to obtaining greater profit from the 
development. The consequences of this being that 
 “with some of the smaller sections is that because these companies are owned by the same 
people the development companies that sell the land to the housebuilders, the housebuilders 
have just realised the houses that they produce are too big for the sections and are trying to 
work out how they are going to fit these massive houses on these tiny sections” [KI2].  
However, as detailed above, participants felt HASHA has impacted upon the number of 
intensive higher density developments which are occurring. It was raised that just to consider 
the numbers for the NUA would skew perceptions [KI4]. A large number of significant 
greenfield developments such as those occurring in Richmond West and retirement village 
style developments have an influence.   




7.3.1 Development Typological Characteristics  
This section compares the characteristics of consented HASHA housing developments since 
the signing of the housing accords in 2015 to those in the preceding ten-year period. This 
characterisation of housing development is the direct application of the Urban Taxonomy 
Framework introduced in Chapter 3; building on the qualitative results from key informant 
interviews. The results of this section have been obtained through a GIS analysis on the 
research area and content analysis of resource consents submitted under HASHA. As outlined 
within the Methodology Chapter, this has enabled the calculation of average lot sizes (where 
applicable), equivalent dwelling density per hectare, and building coverages (where available).  
The results are organised by council to enabled a comparison between the consenting 
processes. 
7.3.1.1 Urban Development for Housing Baseline 2005-2014 
Spatial analysis of data from this period was used to generate a comparative data set to examine 
changes in indicators of development typologies from the baseline to those developments 
consented under HASHA. 
Residential densities from land titles created between 2005 and 2014 were similar across 
Nelson and Richmond with average land title area being 14.99 du ha and 15.26 du ha 
respectively (Table 17 below). Both of these values are indicative of the low-density low rise 
urban form typology. Much of the residential areas in the NUA is detached single-family 
dwellings. This dwelling density value is on the upper threshold for this typology though, 
indicating a mix of typologies, some of which would fulfil the criteria for medium density 
residential. An example of this is in the number of unit titles created in this period — this title 
system is used for multi-unit housing developments on one section such as apartments.    
For this period the subdivision of existing lots in residential areas contributed several new 
sections. This infill intensification has allowed detached medium-sized homes to be built close 
together, increasing the dwelling density. This intensification is evidenced in the higher 
dwelling density (27.32 du ha) for the Residential Higher Density zone. The more enabling 
standards of the NRMP in this zone, such as minimum allotment area and density, impact the 
rate and scale of infill and double-storey development. The dwelling density for the Residential 
Higher Density Zone reflects the typological description of a suburban medium density 
residential neighbourhood. In contrast, the dwelling density of the RIDA (20.833 du ha), while 




still above the threshold for medium density residential, is less reflective of the more permissive 
rule framework for this area as the plan change had not become operative.   
 
Table 17:Dwelling density derived from land titles created between the period 2005 and 2014 in the Nelson Urban Area. 
Dwelling densities are displayed for each residential zone from the respective resource management plans. Data sourced 
from Land Information NZ. 
 
Calculated building coverages for this period are also a complementary indicator of urban form 
through its influence on dwelling densities. Building site coverage is controlled by the rule 
framework within the NRMP and TRMP through standards about lot sizes, coverage, setbacks, 
and outdoor living spaces. Average building coverage for all residentially zoned titles created 
in this period was consistent across the NUA (Table 17). The building coverages for the 
Residential Higher Density zone were notably higher, reflective of the presence of medium 
density residential typologies as they either have a multi-unit dwelling on a single lot or 
detached houses on smaller lots. The higher value for the Residential – Richmond South 
Development Area is the result of a subdivision containing a significant number of large 






Average Land Title Area (Lot 
area) 
Equivalent Dwelling 
Density (du ha) 
All Residential 667m2 14.99 du ha 
Residential 687m2 14.55 du ha 
Residential Higher Density 366m2 27.32 du ha 
Residential Lower Density 913m2 10.95 du ha 
TRMP Zone 
Average Land Title Area (Lot 
area) 
Equivalent Dwelling 
Density (du ha) 
All Residential 655m2 15.26 du ha 
Residential 709m2 14.1 du ha 
Residential – Richmond 
Intensive Development Area 
480m2 20.833 du ha 
Residential – Richmond South 
Development Area 
634m2 15.77 du ha 





Table 18: Average building coverage for titles created between 2005-2014 in the residential zones of the Nelson Urban 
Area. Data sourced from Land Information New Zealand and Authors Research (2019). 
 
7.3.1.2 HASHA Developments  
The analysis of the consented HASHA developments has determined yields (Table 19), 
equivalent dwelling densities, average lot size where applicable, and average building 
coverages where available, for the NCC and TDC (Table 20 and Table 21). As discussed within 
Chapter 4, equivalent dwelling densities do not reflect neighbourhood scale characteristics; 
rather, it is a quantitative method of comparing new development to wider neighbourhood 
typology. Thus, it provides a useful comparison against the permitted standards within the 
NRMP and TRMP for residential development. The tables are grouped by council to enable 
this comparison.  
The numbers of attached dwellings granted resource consent under HASHA have increased 
from the averages between the baseline period of 2005 to 2015. This acquires more significance 
when comparing the proportion of attached to detached dwelling typologies in the two periods. 
The average proportionate yield of attached dwellings between 2005-2014 was 13.5%. Under 
HASHA, attached dwelling typologies make up 29.1% of all consented dwellings. 
Additionally, comparing supply against current occupancy of 11.7% of NUA residents in 
attached dwellings shown in Table 7. This represents a significantly higher supply against 
demand. While attached dwellings typically have a smaller number of bedrooms and therefore 
potential occupants, this is still a notable increase. While these represent dwellings which have 
Nelson Residential 
Zones 




Average Building Site 
Coverage 2005-2014 
All Residential 36.60% All 36.74% 





















been granted resource consent, the staging of some of these developments will mean that the 
actual delivery date and subsequently building consent yields will vary. However, these values 
still represent significant increases in average yearly yields for attached dwelling typologies 
across the NUA. 
Table 19: Dwelling and serviced lot yields from consented developments under HASHA within the Nelson Urban Area. 





Nelson City Council 
Tasman District 
Council 
Nelson Urban Area 
Attached Dwellings 293 66 359 
Detached Dwellings 159 256 415 
Serviced Lots 459 442 459 
 
 
Table 20: Typological measures of housing development in the Nelson City Council SHA sourced from resource consent applications and decisions. Source: Authors Research (2019). 
SHA NRMP Zone 
Year 
Consented 
















2016 0.1182 ha Apartments 17  143.82 15 
Bishopdale 
Pottery 




2017 1.1764 ha Apartments 39  33.15 20 
Orchard 
Street 
Residential 2016 0.1464 ha Duplexes 6  40.98 7.5 
Three Ridges Residential 2017 5.5674 ha 
Attached  22 271 44.89 
10 
Detached 17 939 39.59 
Toi Toi Street Residential 2016 14.0628 ha 
Attached 120  
14.36 12 
Detached 82  





2016 0.175ha Apartments 32  182.86 20 
371 Wakefield 
Quay 









Table 21: Typological measures of housing development in the Tasman District Council SHA sourced from resource consent applications and decisions. Source: Authors Research (2019). 
SHA TRMP Zone 
Year 
Consented 


















2018 4.33 ha 
Serviced 
Lots 
31 16.47 607  
12 
Detached 24 27.21 367.5 33.2% 







2018 8.04 ha 
Detached 160 











386 19.32 517.5  
12 
Attached 96 28.7 348 46.9% 
323 Hill 
Street 
Rural Residential 2018 10.3979 
Serviced 
Lots 
25 5.87 1703  7.5 




Table 1 shows that the majority of housing delivered under HASHA in the NUA has been 
detached dwellings and serviced lots for detached dwellings; largely a function of the scale of 
the Richmond West developments. It is significant, however, that the number of attached 
dwellings consented in the NCC far exceed those for detached typologies. Across the NUA, 12 
of a total 15 consented developments include some component of attached, higher density 
development. The total yield for attached dwellings across the NUA being 359 units (66 for 
the TDC and 293 for the NCC) for the period 2016-2019 (Table 19). The number of attached 
dwellings has decreased the average lot sizes consented under HASHA. This decrease is a 
function development delivering higher density development typologies that still have freehold 
title on the land alongside standard density lots. An example of this is the Three Ridges 
development which is delivering to the market attached terraces and detached dwellings. 
However, peri-urban/rural residential lots were still consented in the Farleigh and 323 Hill 
Street SHA (Figure 19).   
The attached dwelling typologies varied across the NUA. Many of the brownfield SHA within 
the NCC area were two or more storey apartment buildings either in the Inner City Fringe or 
Suburban Commercial zones. Examples of this are the SHA at 237 Haven Road, Betts Carpark, 
Ocean Lodge, and Paru Paru Road. The equivalent dwelling densities and the typological 
descriptors for these developments are well within the threshold for high-density medium-rise 
residential typology for inner-city sites. The increase in the scale of these developments from 
the preceding period is significant, as permitted heights for some SHA in residential zones 12 
metres while for the Inner City zones this increases to 20 metres. For comparison, the permitted 
height in the Inner City zone is 15 metres, while in the Residential zone it is 7.5 metres.  
In contrast, the attached dwellings within consented developments for the Meadows and Fields 
SHA were all one storey duplexes or two storey townhouses (Figure 20). This difference is 
mostly a result of the lower land values involved with greenfield developments. The range of 
typologies present in these developments is largely medium density residential. While 
equivalent dwelling densities are higher for some of the terraced dwellings, they involve 
smaller building footprints leaving more open space between them. The calculated average 
building coverages for attached typologies within the Fields (46.88%) and the Meadows 
(39.1%) developments reflect this as both offer townhouses and duplex units (Figure 21 and 
Figure 22) on smaller lots, however, still maintain a balance of impervious and pervious 
surfaces. The housing typologies delivered under HASHA are of a much higher density than 
what was experienced even in the Richmond Intensive area. This increase is density is notable 




as these are greenfield developments on the urban periphery with effectively no limit on land 
consumption compared to brownfield redevelopment. 
 
Figure 19: Serviced lots at the consented 323 Hill Street special housing area in Richmond. Source: Author’s Research 
2019. 





Figure 20: Two storey townhouses under construction at the Fields special housing area in Richmond. Source: Author's 
Research 2019. 
 
Figure 21: Example townhouse which has been consented for the Meadows special housing area in Richmond. Source 
Redbox Architects (2018). 






Figure 22: Example duplex unit which has been consented for the Meadows special housing area in Richmond. Source 
Redbox Architects (2018). 
  





This chapter of the results has identified how incentives are generated under HASHA and the 
typological outcomes which have been observed in the NUA. Through the alternative 
consenting path, developers are offered a reduction in cost associated with timeline and delays 
through no public notification of applications which would have been notified under the RMA. 
This offers a considerable reduction in risk for developments of higher intensity or out of sone 
developments such as those occurring in Richmond West. Participants identified these 
incentives as being crucial for the market delivery of housing under HASHA as they 
significantly impact the feasibility of development through the reduction in costs and overall 
increased certainty in consent outcomes through the alternative consenting process. 
Additionally, while participants identified that HASHA has primarily delivered development 
typologies reflective of the status quo during the baseline, they also acknowledged that there 
had been an increase in higher density development typologies. This is supported by the results 
of the analysis on resource consents, showing the highest proportion of dwellings to be 
detached but observing increased residential dwelling densities through a mix of typologies 
being consented. Significantly, higher density attached typologies such as apartments and 
terrace housing have experienced an increase in the overall proportion of dwellings being 
consented. These findings, and those in the previous chapter will be discussed in relation to the 
framework presented in the literature and the overall aim of this research in the following 
chapter. 
 





This chapter discusses the results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 by establishing linkages to 
literature. The topics discussed within the literature review are applied to the results to address 
the research aim and objectives. Figure 23 outlines the structure of this chapter is an adaption 
of Figure 4 presented in Chapter 3. The framework presented there viewed the incentives 
offered by HASHA as an additional layer through which the urban development for housing 
process passed through, inducing the incentivised development outcomes. This layer existed 
below the regulatory plans and policy layer, The results of the research reveal that the 
incentives offered under HASHA are through bypassing the regulatory plans and policy layer 
(Represented as the doughnut in this layer in Figure 23). This doughnut is the alternative 
consenting process which represents a renegotiation of the user rights regime for urban land. 
The first section of this chapter relates to the first research objective and addresses the 
formulation and implementation of HASHA (housing policy) within the NUA. The results 
reveal that politics influence the implementation of policy through how the issue is framed and 
how control and power are exerted through government structures. The second section of this 
chapter relates to the second research objective and the evaluation of the incentives offered 
under the implementation of HASHA.  The research identified two critical dimensions of 
incentivisation: cost and risk. Transaction theory enables the contextualization of incentives 
within the market-led process of delivering housing. Finally, the third section addresses the 
third research objective, which sought to identify how the incentives offered under HASHA 
impacted on the housing development typologies delivered in the NUA. The findings of the 
research show that while the housing delivered will predominantly be low density, low rise 
typologies, the reduction in costs changed the feasibility assessment for all development 
typologies. Through a change in the risk profile, developers were more willing to accept the 
potential risk relating to market capacity from uncertain consumer demand.










Figure 23: Urban development outcomes from the implementation of HASHA. The incentives of HASHA arose through 
bypassing the RMA regulatory system represented by the hole in the middle layer. 
     
                   
                 
                          
          
                   
  
            
                   




8.1 HASHA: Ideology and Politics  
The literature on housing supply widely acknowledges political dimensions; therefore, the 
direct identification of this within the research then is unsurprising. In assessing the 
implementation of HASHA within the NUA, it became quickly apparent was how pervasive 
politics were throughout the entire implementation process for HASHA. The findings of this 
research support the arguments of Peck and Tickell (2002) as the HASHA is an example of 
neoliberal ‘roll-out’ policy. Participants identified the framing of the issue, and the numbers 
focus as specific features of the implementation of HASHA. In addition to this, the ‘roll-out’ 
enabled a temporary but significant restructuring of decision making in the NUA. These 
directly support arguments of ‘roll-out’ policy and will be explored below. 
8.1.2 Ideology and Policy Framing  
Multiple participants identified that through having the primary purpose of HASHA as the 
delivery of housing, the primary concern of central government was the numbers (Section 6.1). 
This concern reflects the framing of the housing affordability problem in the formulation of the 
policy. Evidence is abundant from the government which suggests that planning regulation is 
artificially constraining the supply of land for development, impacting upon the markets ability 
to meet the demand for housing (e.g. Ministry for the Environment, 2010; Ministry for 
Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2013). The perceptions of participants suggested that 
this was a continuation of the broader discourse which problematises planning through 
arguments about supply elasticities (Gurran et al., 2014). Previous research in New Zealand 
has identified the role of evidence-based policy within the deployment of HASHA (Murphy, 
2014). The findings from this research suggest that the implementation of HASHA in the NUA 
provides another example of this, impacting upon the observed urban development outcomes. 
The overall aim of HASHA was to increase housing supply. Participants identified that the 
numbers of dwellings delivered was the single metric by which measured the performance 
against this aim within the NUA. This research presents another example of ‘roll-out’ 
neoliberalism through the deployment of neoliberal metrics through which performance is 
measured (Peck and Tickell, 2002). The evaluation of policy in this manner has two impacts. 
The first is in the way in which HASHA enabled the government of the day to state that they 
were addressing the issue of housing affordability to consolidate both power and obtain further 
political capital (Adams, 2011; Beer et al., 2007). Secondly, it was identified within the 
research that numbers subverted the consideration of planning and good planning outcomes 




from the process. An example of this is the three Richmond West SHA. This area had been 
earmarked to provide the land for commercial and light industrial development for years into 
the future. The use of this land for housing has a perverse effect in terms of maintaining future 
capacity for commercial and industrial activities. There are substantial geographic constraints 
for additional commercial capacity in the Nelson City Council while maintaining the 
productive capacity of land outside of Richmond is also a priority. Therefore the land taken for 
housing may prove to be hard to replace without generating effects elsewhere. This scenario 
provides an example of the 'roll-out' of neoliberal policy which promotes market-led 
development to the detriment of other policy and elements of good urban development (Jessop, 
2002).   
8.1.2 Politics and Decision Hierarchies  
As KI2 stated, the structure of decision-making within HASHA runs contrary to the established 
norms of devolved decision-making. The ‘roll-out’ of HASHA imposed top-down policy upon 
local government. By maintaining both the right to impose and veto the declaration of SHA 
despite the signing of housing accords, central government exerted significant power over local 
urban development for housing. Once an SHA is in place, the access granted to the alternative 
consenting pathway and the hierarchy of considerations within section 34 of HASHA enables 
the total imposition of the overall political goal (increase in housing production numbers) on 
local government decision making. The implications of this are twofold:  
Firstly, this represents a perfect example of the rescaling of state power within the NUA and 
wider urban New Zealand. This rescaling has been identified previously under the 'roll-out' of 
neoliberal policy within urban and housing legislation under the National Government New 
Zealand (e.g. Murphy, 2015; Gurran et al., 2014). However, this has primarily been identified 
or more readily apparent within the global city of Auckland through the Super City 
amalgamation or under the exceptional circumstances of post-earthquake Christchurch under 
the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (Lewis and Murphy, 2014). HASHA has been 
used to fundamentally challenge the long-established powers of local government to control 
urban development within territorial boundaries of the TDC and NUA. The apparent political 
agenda of  HASHA evidences the impact of 'roll-out' neoliberalism can have at multiple levels. 
Interestingly, this 'roll-out' has had a tangible impact on the NUA through the outcomes of 
implementing HASHA. Given the scale implied under the pursuit of global competitiveness in 
neoliberal policy, this is a further example of neoliberalism shaping the 'spaces between 
institutions' (Peck and Tickell, 2002).  




Secondly, the rescaling of power placed significant limits on the ability of local government to 
manage the impacts, positive or negative, of HASHA. The research findings suggest that the 
top-down nature of HASHA promotes uniformity in implementation across councils (Section 
6.2.2). Politics and ideology play a significant role in this as HASHA is an example of 
neoliberal preferences which privilege market-led responses to what is essentially a social issue 
(housing affordability) (Jessop, 2002). Somewhat paradoxically, this structure meant that the 
exclusion of affordability criteria from the housing accords was the only meaningful variable 
which could be manipulated by the local governments in the NUA. Policies external to 
HASHA, such as the Lead Policy of the TDC, could be adopted to guide council decision 
making for recommending SHA. However, the retention of power by central government 
limited the impact that these could have as SHA were evaluated using independent criteria 
(Section 6.2.2).  
Through the rescaling of power enabled by HASHA, the role of local government in New 
Zealand was reaffirmed as 'policy-takers' (Sancton, 2006). Both the Nelson City and Tasman 
District Councils both have a clear policy position within their resource management plans of 
urban containment. While being earmarked for mixed business development through the 
deferred zoning, the SHA designation of land in Richmond West impacted upon the ability of 
the TDC to implement their containment policy. Future business development was replaced 
with immediate large scale (50+ ha) intensive residential greenfield development. 
Implementing HASHA within the NUA limited the ability of the NCC and TDC to implement 
their own policy, instead the housing first policy of central government became paramount. 
Murphy (2015) supports this, arguing that central government used housing affordability as an 
opportunity to alter the power dynamics between central and local government. The 
implications of this to decision-making and the delivery of housing will be discussed in the 
next section.  
8.2 Incentives for Housing Development  
The findings of the research suggest that HASHA has had an impact upon the urban 
development for housing which has occurred in the NUA (Section 7.4). The second research 
objective seeks to identify how HASHA has incentivised the outcomes from this urban 
development for housing. The research identified three main outcomes: more out of zone 
greenfield residential development, higher dwelling densities, and more medium-density 
residential typologies. This section will examine the incentives which HASHA offered for 




these outcomes. The findings from the research illustrate that HASHA embodied an incentive-
based approach to policy (Bengston et al., 2004). Through a quintessentially neoliberal policy, 
HASHA privileged a market-led response to the issue of housing affordability. Incentives were 
given to the market through a renegotiation of the user rights regime for land under the 
alternative consenting process. Subsequently, HASHA offered two major incentives: reduction 
in cost and risk.  
8.2.1 Cost and Renegotiation 
The alternative consenting process of HASHA can best be described as a renegotiation of the 
user rights regime for land which occur in transactions between the market and institutions 
(council) (Buitelaar, 2007). Applying this to the RMA, the research identified that it was a 
rezoning tool (Section 7.1.2). The renegotiation occurred through the hierarchy of 
considerations under section 34 of the Act, which inserted improving housing supply at the top 
of the hierarchy of effects to be considered in granting resource consent for developments 
(Section 6.2.3). Thus displacing the duty to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse environmental 
effects as the primary consideration, under which all previous user rights regimes were 
negotiated. Figure 24 illustrates this process, displaying two pathways through which the 
negotiation of user rights occurs. 
The regular user rights regime is negotiated under the RMA and occurs solely between market 
actors and the local government when applying for resource consent under devolved 
governance. The established regulatory process for resource consents under the RMA adheres 
to the policy framework that is established under the district plans for the NUA.  The council 
determines the appropriate use of the land through the application of policy, permitted 
standards, and activity classifications with rules. Through this, the NCC and TDC have 
regulated the typologies and spatial arrangement of housing development. Thus, the transaction 
which the normal RMA consent process is contained solely within the silo of local government 
generated and consulted plans and policies produced by the TDC and the NCC.   
The results identify that HASHA has changed the structures through which developers and 
institutions interact for the production of housing. There is a significant divergence of decision-
making authority, as the ultimate control over SHA designation lies with the central 
government. Once an SHA is imposed,  the alternative consenting pathway becomes available, 
which prioritises the government's policy goal of increasing housing supply. This pathway 
effectively removes the considerations of the locally produced TRMP and NRMP and replaces 




it with a framework of evaluation directly informed by this policy goal (Section 7.1.2). The 
change in structure occurs as the user rights regime is now effectively determined by the central 
government which comes from a position that housing is the most appropriate use of all land 
if the market deems it feasible. While both the NCC and the TDC maintain the 
regulatory/administrative functions, this role has changed as it is directly implementing the 
policy goal of central government in final negotiations of the user rights regime. Thus, the 
negotiation of the user rights regime occurs between the market and central government, with 
local government as its proxy for implementation 





Figure 24:Government policy influence on the negotiation of user rights regimes for housing development under the 
alternative consenting path provided in HASHA. 




8.2.2 Cost and Risk Incentives  
The research findings suggest that the incentives for housing development offered under 
HASHA are reductions in cost and risk. As discussed in the section above, the alternative 
consenting process changes how the effects of development are assessed, with the positive 
effects of increasing housing supply being the primary consideration. This change alters how 
transactions impose costs upon development (Buitelaar, 2007). Costs accrue through the 
negotiation of the user rights regime for land due to the interactions between a developer and 
a managing institution (Brueckner, 2009). Those costs which relate directly to the process are 
classified as compliance costs, while costs that arise from the outcomes of the negotiation are 
classified as deadweight costs (Nunns and Rohani, 2016). Direct cost incentives under HASHA 
can be viewed in terms of a reduction in compliance costs. Furthermore, reducing risk translates 
to reductions in deadweight costs. 
The research identified compliance cost incentives under HASHA. Participants identified the 
removal of public notification and the removal of specific zoning requirements such as outdoor 
living space as the core compliance cost reductions under HASHA (Section 7.1). Many 
consented SHA developments would have been subject to public notification under the RMA 
because of the scale and significance of their effects. Notable examples identified by 
participants were the Betts Carpark and the Meadows SHA. Public notification would have 
significantly extended timelines through the requirement for public hearings and subsequent 
potential for appeals to higher judicial authorities. These findings are not unsurprising as the 
relationship between planning induced delay and increased development costs has been widely 
examined in literature (e.g., Mayo and Sheppard, 2001; Ball, 2010).  
Furthermore, the alternative consenting path of HASHA allowed for compliance with 
permitted standards and zoning requirements to not be weighted as highly in the decision to 
grant consent. The research found that this was particularly important for brownfield 
intensification development within the NCC (Section 7.1.3). Grimes and Mitchell (2015) 
identified this as a compliance cost which is unique for housing development which is 
delivering apartment or attached typologies. More flexibility surrounding outdoor living space, 
height, bulk and car parking requirements under the NRMP reduced the initial design costs of 
development for apartment typologies in Nelson. 
 




Deadweight costs for the scale of development delivered under HASHA would have been 
considerable if processed under the RMA. The reduction in risk is directly associated with the 
renegotiation of the user rights regime under the alternative consenting pathway. Resource 
consents are considered against the primary purpose of HASHA. As the SHA developments all 
met the primary purpose of HASHA, certainty was given to developers as they all improved 
the housing supply within the NUA. This increase in certainty is consistent with the impact of 
risk on outcomes under the options model for housing development presented by Grimes and 
Mitchell (2015). The risk reduction in applying for consent under HASHA was observed to 
affect the decision to apply for consent as the certainty, and reduced timeframes reduced the 
developments exposure to risk. The impact on potential profits presents a risk in this instance 
as delays introduce higher market volatility in forecasting profits and the potential of additional 
market supply to depress demand (Grime and Mitchell, 2015; Mayo and Sheppard, 2001). 
Risk reduction was identified to apply to both out of zone greenfield development and 
intensification on brownfield sites. However, the results suggest that the certainty in consent 
being granted most affected developers decisions to deliver higher density typologies. Mayo 
and Sheppard (2001) support this observation, arguing that certainty in consent outcomes 
affects the type of development submitted for approval. Participants observed that HAHSA 
increased the opportunities for developers to get an apartment building approved (Section 
7.1.2). The overall effect of the cost incentives under HASHA is captured within assessments 
of the feasibility of development which will be discussed further in the following section.   
8.3 Effect of Incentives: Market Delivery of Housing  
The combined effect of reducing compliance and deadweight costs has been on improving the 
feasibility of development. The research has identified that while the alternative consenting 
process of HASHA has primarily been used to deliver standard density lots and detached 
dwellings. This is consistent with the findings of Fernandez et al. (2019), who argue that the 
only variation in the attributes of housing delivered under HASHA is the rate of delivery. 
However, evidence from this research also indicates that HASHA has impacted upon the 
decision of developers to deliver higher density typologies. The results show that HASHA 
significantly reduced the deadweight costs for developments like Betts Carpark development 
(Section 7.1.2). Of the consented SHA analysed in the NUA, seven were for multi-unit 
apartment buildings ranging in yield from three units to 39 units despite occupancy rates and 
overall supply of attached dwellings demonstrating that they provide a small share of dwellings 
for the NUA.  It is therefore interesting that HASHA has resulted in an increased supply of 




these typologies. The research findings show there are two related factors which contribute to 
the increased delivery of higher density housing typologies: reduction in deadweight costs, and 
the impact on feasibility assessments.  
The literature establishes that the market supply of housing is a speculative exercise (e.g. Ball, 
1986; Adams et al., 2009; Bramley, 2013). Developers make an informed assessment of the 
market demands and supply a product which is desirable and therefore profitable (Rowley and 
Phibbs, 2012). The results suggest that the cost incentives offered to developers under HASHA 
changed the feasibility equation of delivering housing (Section 7.2). The reduction of 
consenting risk and compliance costs changed the risk profile of development and therefore, 
potential profit margins which enabled a greater diversity of housing typologies delivered to 
the market. This will be explored using the example of the Meadows SHA. 
The Meadows SHA is an out of zone greenfield development in Richmond West. This 
development was consented under HASHA and given the policy and rule framework of the 
TRMP would not have been consented under the RMA (Section 7.1.2). This development will 
eventually yield 386 serviced lots which will support detached housing of a low-density low-
rise typology. However, in addition to this, 96 attached terraced dwellings will also be 
constructed of a medium-density medium-rise typology. The feasibility of delivering these 
terraced units was impacted by the reduction in costs associated with the overall development. 
While the market capacity was not strong, evidenced by the slow sales, the developers were 
willing to accept this burden of risk than they would have otherwise through the broader 
incentives offered to the development (Sharam et al., 2015). As discussed above, the alternative 
consenting of HASHA removed a significant element of the consenting risk. This change in 
the risk profile affected the typologies which were delivered under HASHA as profit margins 
were overall less uncertain. This observation is supported by the findings of Leishman (2015); 
cost changes directly impacted the decision of the market on what to supply. The Three Ridges 
development is also another example of this. 
KI3 hoped that an increased supply of high-quality examples of higher density housing 
typologies might change the perceptions of this lifestyle. Applying Ball's (1986) structures of 
provision to the NUA, at present the desired utility value of dwellings by consumers is 
inextricably linked with the low rise detached dwelling typology.  The rates of occupancy and 
market supply reflect this utility value (Section 5.1.3). The consequence of this being that is 
what speculative developments are delivering those most desirable utility values. What may 




change in the future is that when market capacity assessments are undertaken in the future, the 
examples of medium density housing typologies may impact the absorption ability of the 
market as the benefits become more tangible. Thus the utility value sought by the consumer 
will have changed, and a deeper market capacity will exist for higher density typologies in the 
NUA.   
While there is a substantial element of forecasting within this, the changing demographics and 
the resultant change in utility value sought may see this come to fruition. There is evidence of 
this in the results of this research. The slow sales of attached terraced dwellings for the 
Meadows SHA were associated with the relative unfamiliarity of the product with the 
consumers in the area (Section 7.2). This rate of sales changed when there were tangible 
examples constructed so prospective buyers could walk through them and assess the utility that 
they would offer. The overall implications of this being that HASHA has provided an 
opportunity to overcome the risk which prevents the site value uplift from meeting the 
preferences of consumers for higher density typologies identified in Sharam et al. (2015).  
8.4 Summary 
The discussion regarding the implementation of HASHA has been informed by the results in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The implementation of HASHA within the NUA was highly political,  
and allowed greater remit for central government involvement over planning and urban 
development for housing Thus, there is little scope for local government to influence urban 
development outcomes from HASHA; this was primarily a market-led exercise once an SHA 
was designated. HASHA offered significant incentives for development through cost 
reductions which impacted upon the feasibility of developing higher density typologies. The 
impact of increased feasibility is evidenced in the increased supply of medium-density 








9 Conclusion  
Housing affordability has been a significant focus of governments globally. This issue is 
framed in terms of inelastic supply generating bubbles as the market struggles to keep pace 
with demand. The response of many administrations has centred around the problematisation 
of planning as the cause of inelastic supply. This problematisation has occurred despite 
evidence to the contrary that other factors such as microeconomic variables and the decisions 
of developers are just as influential in generating inelastic supply. Governments have pushed 
to remove regulatory restrictions through policies, such as HASHA, which promote a 
quintessentially neoliberal market-led response to the housing affordability crisis. Adopting a 
neoclassical economic view, the market will deliver the housing typologies which net the 
highest return based upon current demand. However, the housing delivered under these policies 
may generate unpriced externalities from less sustainable urban development patterns. 
The outcomes of HASHA have primarily only been evaluated concerning their efficacy in 
addressing housing affordability. In New Zealand, literature has focused on Auckland, which 
through factors such as size, is less reflective of the broader housing market in New Zealand. 
Short-term policy responses to housing affordability have long-term impacts on the form and 
functioning of our urban environments. Thus, this research aimed to establish a more 
comprehensive evidence base through assessing the urban development for housing outcomes 
from the implementation of HASHA in the NUA. To support this aim, the following research 
objectives were devised: 
1. To assess the implementation of the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act 
2013 in the Nelson Urban Area. 
2. To evaluate how the implementation of policy can provide incentives for particular 
urban development typologies in the Nelson Urban Area. 
3. To assess what urban development typologies have resulted in the incentives offered 
under the implementation of the Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act 2013 
in the Nelson Urban Area. 
To address the research aim, a mixed-methods approach was taken, framed by the philosophical 
position of critical realism. The methods included qualitative document analysis of primary 
and secondary research data and interviews with key informants and quantitative GIS analysis 
of property title and building coverage data. The goal of this mixed-methods approach was to 




obtain convergent validation of the results to develop an increased depth of understanding than 
what a single method would achieve. This was achieved by comparing the results derived from 
the qualitative methods with the quantitative methods. The quantitative methods established a 
typological baseline of urban development for housing which occurred under the normal 
regulatory regime during the ten years 2005-2014 before the singing of the housing accords. 
The key findings of this approach will be summarised in the following section.  
9.1 Key Findings  
In addressing the overall aim of this research, the results indicate that while the implementation 
of HASHA has primarily delivered urban development patterns reflective of the status quo 
low-rise low-density typology, it has simultaneously increased the forecast supply of higher 
density medium-rise medium-density typologies. This is forecast supply as much of what has 
been consented is yet to be delivered to the market. The discussion in Chapter 8 presented the 
results relating to the research objectives, demonstrating that the incentives offered for the 
market delivery of housing were in the subjugation of the RMA and the plans and policies 
under its framework. The key dimensions of this process will now be summarised.  
9.1.1 Objective 1 
The results show that the implementation of HASHA was highly political and typical of a ‘roll-
out’ neoliberal policy. The prioritisation of delivering housing, a political goal of the central 
government, was imposed within the research area. This was enabled through the significant 
rescaling of power which occurred once housing accords were signed. The process of 
recommending and imposing SHA within the NUA established a power dynamic that 
restructured the decision-making process for both councils concerning urban development for 
housing. Once SHA are imposed, the policy goal of central government to increase housing 
supply became the guiding consideration of applications under the alternative consenting 
pathway of HASHA. The implications of this relate to the second research objective. This study 
has not attempted to assess the relative merits or deficiencies of this restructuring. Rather it is 
concerned with assessing the resultant urban development for housing outcomes.  
9.1.2 Objective 2 
The research findings indicate that HASHA is an incentive-based approach to policy. Through 
offering the alternative consenting pathway to qualifying developments in SHA, the primary 
consideration in the weighting of environmental effects is the delivery of housing. The 
restructuring of regulatory power enabled the renegotiation of the user rights regime for land 




in SHA, effectively removing the consideration of objectives, policies, and rules established 
by local government under the RMA from the consenting process. When considered in 
conjunction with the removal of public notification from the process, this significantly reduced 
the compliance costs compared to the normal consenting process under the RMA. Furthermore, 
this renegotiation of the user rights regime reduced the deadweight costs of development. The 
core component of this was in the reduction of risk and uncertainty in the consent outcomes for 
housing development; all applications for resource consent achieved the primary consideration 
of the alternative consenting process: delivering housing in the NUA. The reduction in costs 
offered incentives to developers to proceed with the applications and subsequently, housing 
development through improving the feasibility of development. 
9.1.3 Objective 3 
The observed outcomes from the implementation of HASHA within this research were 
primarily the continuation of the status quo for housing development typologies. Although 
HASHA did influence spatial patterns of development as it enabled more out of zone and 
greenfield housing development to occur. This is largely a function of the market meeting the 
assessed demand for housing. However, the incentives offered under HASHA also improved 
the feasibility of higher density housing development typologies. The established regulatory 
framework for these typologies was identified as being prohibitive to the market delivery of 
housing developments such as Betts Carpark. The results suggest that the improvement in the 
overall feasibility for higher density housing encouraged developers to supply these despite 
uncertain market capacity. The results and the literature highlight the importance of example, 
higher density developments delivered under HASHA due to the opportunities they provide for 
changing perceptions about the desired utility value obtained from housing. 
9.2 Implications  
The findings of this research may hold significance for the approach of both the NCC and TDC 
in reviewing their resource management plans under the RMA. Despite major plan changes 
which seek to promote a rule framework conducive to intensification through higher-density 
development typologies, it was recognised by participants that overall, they had little effect on 
feasibility. Both councils are currently undertaking full reviews which will include the 
identification of issues and options to address these issues. An aging population, geographic 
constraints, and loss of productive land are all likely to be priority issues for both councils. 
Intensification offers significant benefits for addressing these issues. While the results of this 




research relate to the implementation of HASHA, the identified causal pathways for incentives 
are still applicable to the RMA. Thus, they may provide value for the review process.   
9.3 Future Research  
Through undertaking this research, two further areas of research are highlighted that would 
enable a better understanding of delivering higher density housing development. This research 
considered the impact of HASHA on the market-led process of delivery of housing from a 
planning-centric view. Approaching the issue of delivering higher density typologies in 
regional cities from a more market-oriented economic position would provide value to councils 
who are dealing with the issues of urban containment and sprawl. This would help the 
formulation of policy at that level which would impact upon the feasibility of higher density 
development typologies. An additional area of study could be in the relationship between what 
has been given resource consent and what is ultimately granted building consent in the NUA. 
This would explore the factors which influenced developers’ decisions to not proceed with 
higher density developments once resource consent has been granted. The literature identifies 
uncertainty in bank lending for development and the intensity capital investment required as 
influential factors, so applying these to the NUA or another similar city in New Zealand would 
be valuable. 
9.4 Conclusion  
The research has achieved its aim by determining that the implementation of HASHA in the 
NUA has resulted in incentivising both development which is reflective of the status quo and 
higher density developments alike. The application of incentives affected both development 
typologies as they both fulfilled the policy and political objective of central government. The 
lasting legacy of HASHA in the NUA may be one of contrast. The SHA in Richmond West 
have created an entirely new suburb which typifies current urban development for housing 
across New Zealand. In contrast, examples of higher density housing typologies delivered may 
prove influential in facilitating the wider appeal and higher uptake amongst the population of 
the NUA. considering the geographic constraints and demographic changes which are 
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URBAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY 
INTERVENTIONS 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR  PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If 
you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and we thank you for 
considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This research is being undertaken as part of the requirements for the University of Otago Master 
of Planning Programme. This research aims to examine what type of urban development at 
local government level has been incentivised from the implementation of the following central 
government policy interventions: 
 
• Housing Accords and Special Housing Areas Act 2013 
 
What Types of Participants are being sought? 
We would like to speak to key stakeholders in Nelson/Richmond who have an insight into 
planning for urban development and those who have navigated this regulatory environment. 
This could include Council officials, residents, community group members and private 
developers. 
 
Participants will be identified through key contacts and publicly available information. At the 
time of recruitment, participants will be asked whether they can identify any other potential 
participants.  
 
What will Participants be asked to do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to participate in a semi-
structured interview. No reward or compensation will be offered for your participation; it is 
purely voluntary. Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to provide 
your views in an interview at a location and at a time that is convenient to you, of up to an hour 
in duration. Since this interview is semi-structured in nature it will be based more on a 
discussion of relevant themes. You will be asked to reflect on several broad topics related to 
the implementation of central government policy at a local government level and the urban 
development outcomes that have resulted from this.  
 
The precise nature of the questions that will be asked has not been determined in advance, but 
will depend on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, although the 




Department is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has 
not been able to review the precise questions to be used. In the event that the line of questioning 
does develop in such a way that you feel uncomfortable, you are reminded of right to decline 
to answer any particular questions. You may decide not to take part in the project without any 
disadvantage to yourself. 
 
What Data or Information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
Interviews will be audio recorded, and subsequently transcribed for use in our research. Only 
the supervisor and the group members undertaking the research will have access to the 
identifiable data. Once the interview data are transcribed, the audio files will be deleted. Aliases 
and pseudonyms will be used to protect your identity, unless you prefer otherwise. On the 
Consent Form you will be given options regarding your anonymity. Please be aware that should 
you wish we will make every attempt to preserve your anonymity. However, with your consent, 
there are some cases where it would be preferable to attribute contributions made to individual 
participants. It is absolutely up to you which of these options you prefer. 
 
The final research report will be made available through the University of Otago Library. Direct 
quotations may be used to provide evidence supporting key points made in the report. Every 
effort will be made to ensure that individual identities are not revealed through these 
quotations, unless you have chosen not to remain anonymous. Data obtained as a result of the 
research and personal information held on the participant will be destroyed at the completion 
of research even though the data derived from the research will, in most cases, be kept for 
much longer or possibly indefinitely. You have the right to withdraw part or all of the provided 
information before August 30th 2019.  
Can Participants change their mind and withdraw from the project? 
If you are hesitant or uncomfortable about answering any question, you have the right to decline 
to answer. If at any time you feel uncomfortable with the interview, you are free to ask for the 
interview to discontinue without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. You may withdraw 
the information provided at any stage up to the 30th of August 2019. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:- 
James Nicol and  Dr Ashraful Alam 
School of Geography   School of Geography  
Phone Number: 0279571353   University Phone: (03) 479 7717 
Email: nicja459@student.otago.ac.nz   Email: ash.alam@otago.ac.nz 
 
This study has been approved by the Department stated above. However, if you have any concerns 
about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you 
will be informed of the outcome. 
  







URBAN DEVELOPMENTS OUTCOMES FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY 
INTERVENTIONS 
CONSENT  FORM  FOR PARTIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage. 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
 
3. Personal identifying information including audio recordings will be destroyed at the conclusion of 
the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure 
storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. You will be asked to reflect on several broad 
topics related to the implementation of central government policy at a local government level and 
the urban development outcomes that have resulted from this. The precise nature of the questions 
which will be asked have not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which 
the interview develops and that in the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that 
I feel hesitant or uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may 
withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind. 
 
  5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.   
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 
       (Signature of participant)     (Date) 
 
............................................................................. 
       (Printed Name) 
 
[8. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research,   OR;  
 








Appendix B: Interview Questions 
How has HASHA been implemented?  
What are the main effects of HASHA? 
How does this affect housing development?  
Does HASHA offer incentives for housing development? 
Do you think the implementation of HASHA incentivised a particular style of development? 
• How does this compare to existing development patterns? 
Do you think HASHA is promoting the supply of a range of dwelling types? 
Do you think that there are mismatched (asymmetrical) preferences when it comes to urban 
development outcomes between local and central government? 
Has this impacted upon the ability of local government to give effect to their urban 
development objectives?  
How has the focus on land supply influenced development outcomes?  
Do you think there has been a balance between in fill and new subdivision?  
Does the market or policy have a greater influence on urban development and supplying 
different housing types? 
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